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ESSAY
UNI]DROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS: THE BLACK
LETTER TEXT AND A REVIEW
JOSEPH M. PERILLO*
INTRODUCTION
Cross-border trading is as natural to humanity as eating, laughing
and crying.' Patterns of trade and the laws regulating them have, as
one would expect, significant similarities. However, when disputes
arise, the conceptual framework and the rationales for the rules of
decision have been far from uniform even where there is uniformity or
similarity of result.
Western States are broadly divided into common law and civil law
systems. Within the common law system, most legal professionals of
England staunchly cling to the supreme value of certainty of result,2
while the legal professionals of the United States generally have been
open to flexible and changing rules, including changes stemming from
civil law influences.3 Similarly, the civil law spans the landscape from
the French family of the formerly radical, but now antiquated, Code
Napoleon, to the relatively modern Italian Codice Civile, and the truly
* Alpin J. Cameron Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. I am
indebted to Steve Thel and Joel Reidenberg for their helpful comments on an earlier
draft of this essay.
1. See Joseph M. Perillo, Exchange, Contract and Law in the Stone Age, 31 Ariz.
L. Rev. 17, 31 (1989).
2. See Barry Nicholas, The United Kingdoin and the Vienna Sales Convention:
Another Case of Splendid Isolation?, 9 Saggi, Conferenze E Seminari 1, 4-9 (1993)
(explaining why the United Kingdom has not adopted the United Nations Convention
for the International Sale of Goods).
3. This openness to civil law influences was described as early as 1834. when Jus-
tice Joseph Story wrote an article for a German publication entitled "American Law."
It was published in a German translation. For the original in English. see Joseph
Story, American Law, 3 Am. J. Comp. L. 9 (1954). As to contracts, Story wrote:
The law with regard to personal or movable property, and contracts. (often
called in the language of common law, choses in action) is in substance that
of England. The same principles and distinctions exist as to the formation,
obligation, interpretation, and execution of contracts. The Law of Bailments,
of Agency, of Partnership, of Insurance, of Bottomry, of Promissory Notes,
of Bills of Exchange, of Shipping and Navigation, and of other maritime and
commercial contracts, is generally, (not universally) the same as that of Eng-
land, except that the American law on these subjects is more expansive and
comprehensive, and liberal, borrowing freely from the law of Continental
Europe, and more disposed to avail itself of the best principles of commerce,




up-to-date Civil Code of the Netherlands, with a panoply of Codes in
between them, not to mention non-codified successors to Roman Law.
Despite the variety of ways in which the conclusions are reached and
articulated, concrete commercial issues tend to have similar resolu-
tions in all of these Western systems. As to the rest of the world, non-
western legal systems have generally adopted a conceptual framework
based on one or another Western prototype, even if decolonization
may have produced major changes in the content of the rules of law.4
Under the auspices of the United Nations Commission on Interna-
tional Trade Law ("UNCITRAL"), an international group of lawyers
and scholars produced the United Nations Convention on the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods ("CISG" or "Convention"), 5 which has been rati-
fied by the United States and thirty-eight other States. It is striking
that this Convention was acceptable to nations from different families
of legal systems, such as the United States and France, and such di-
verse economic backgrounds as China and Germany. In producing
this Convention, UNCITRAL drew heavily on earlier work by the In-
ternational Institute for the Unification of Private Law
("UNIDROIT"), under whose auspices precursors to CISG had been
drafted.6 Many of the same individuals who labored for a considera-
ble number of years to produce the CISG continued under
UNIDROIT auspices to produce the UNIDROIT Principles of Inter-
national Commercial Contracts,7 the black letter text of which is ap-
pended to this review. Produced under the chairmanship of Italy's
Michael Joachim Bonnell, with the participation of such stalwarts as
America's E. Allan Farnsworth and worthies of similar stature from a
considerable number of countries, the product is a significant step for-
ward in the globalization of legal thinking.
To an extent, Principles is modelled on CISG. But in three signifi-
cant ways it departs from CISG. First, it is far broader in scope.
CISG is limited to contracts for the sale of goods and furthermore
eschews many issues relevant to sales contracts. For example, CISG
avoids the question of contractual validity.8 On the other hand, Prin-
4. See Rudolph B. Schlesinger, et al., Comparative Law: Cases-Text-Materi-
als 10-12 (5th ed. 1988).
5. Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods, Apr. 10, 1980, S. Treaty Doc. No. 9, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), re-
printed in 19 I.L.M. 668 (1980) [hereinafter CISG].
6. John 0. Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales Under the 1980
United Nations Convention $J 4-10 (2d ed. 1991). The drafters relied upon the Con-
vention Relating to A Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods, July 1, 1964, 834 U.N.T.S. 107 (1972) (ULF), and the
Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, July 1,
1964, 834 U.N.T.S. 169 (1972) (ULIS). Id. 1 4.
7. International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT), Prin-
ciples of International Commercial Contracts (1994) [hereinafter Principles].
8. Article 4 provides in part: "This Convention ... is not concerned with: (a) the
validity of the contract or of any of its provisions or of any usage." See generally,
[Vol. 63282
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ciples deals not only with the broad range of commercial contracts,
but also with some questions of validity. A second departure from
CISG is that, to the extent that the two documents cover the same
ground, Principles is a better, more mature product. For example, it
deals with the "Battle of the Forms" in an innovative way, which
presents a considerable improvement over the wretched draftsman-
ship of Uniform Commercial Code section 2-207 and the timorous Ar-
ticle 19 of CISG. The third departure is that Principles is not intended
for adoption as a treaty or as a uniform law; rather, the document is in
the nature of a restatement of the commercial contract law of the
world.
I. THE FUNCTION OF PRINCIPLES
One could ask what might be the function of such a restatement.
The Preamble lists a number of practical uses the statement of princi-
ples might have for the judge, arbitrator or practicing lawyer. If the
parties negotiating a contract have difficulty in agreeing on a choice of
law clause, the choice of Principles could avoid deadlock.' If the prin-
ciples had been in existence at the relevant time, it would have been
an ideal choice of legal principles for contracts dealing with the con-
struction of the "Chunnel" connecting England and France. Feelings
of national dignity precluded each side from acceding to the choice of
the other's law. Similarly, if the contract declares that it is governed
by "general principles of law" or the like, Principles can be a primary
source for the adjudication of any dispute that may arise from the
contract."0 In addition, Principles could be employed as a supplement
for decisions under other international agreements, such as CISG.
Moreover, if the rules of conflict of laws point to a State whose law is
obscure, undeveloped or merely difficult to ascertain, the judges or
arbitrators have a neutral resource to apply. This last function of
Helen Elizabeth Hartnell, Rousing the Sleeping Dog: The Validity F-rception to the
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 18 Yale J. Int'l L. 1
(1993) (discussing the range of interpretations available to adjudicators and proposing
a "middle of the road" approach).
9. For a discussion of such deadlocks, see I Pierre Bonassies et al., General Prin-
ciples of Law Project of the Cornell Law School, Formation of Contracts: A Study of
the Common Core of Legal Systems 13-16 (Rudolph B. Schlesinger ed. 1968) [herein-
after Formation of Contracts].
10. Id. at 7-13. For an example of such a clause, see Noto v. Cia Secula di Arma-
nento, 310 F. Supp. 639, 646 n.17 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). The clause stated:
In view of the diverse nationalities of the parties to this Agreement, it shall
be governed by and interpreted and applied in accordance with principles of
law common to Iran and the several nations in which the other parties to this
Agreement are incorporated, and in the absence of such common principles,
then by and in accordance with principles of law recognized by civilized na-




Principles should not be underestimated, as this is one of the primary
functions of a restatement in the United States.
There is, I believe, another dimension to Principles that the Pream-
ble does not state. Comparative law is a humanistic discipline. A
comparison of legal systems expands the mind.1 Provisions within
Principles regarding issues on which the common law and civil law
systems have different conceptual frameworks (e.g., specific perform-
ance and penalty clauses) show that the drafters were able to break
out of their respective conceptual straitjackets to reach common
ground. This only could have happened by a process of mutual educa-
tion and the expansion of understanding.
II. FORMATION OF CONTRACTS
To the extent that the rules of formation of contracts contained in
Principles are at variance with the rules laid down by CISG, they im-
prove them. For example, the newer document specifically adopts a
rule that a contract may be formed without a process of offer and
acceptance. 12 Its definition of "offer" is simpler; language in the
CISG definition that was erroneous, or at best confusing, has been
eliminated.'3 Furthermore, the apparently invariable requirement
that an express or implicit price term is essential to an offer has been
eliminated. 4
To understand Principles' offer and acceptance mechanism, it is im-
portant to know that by the law of Germany, Italy, Switzerland and
some other civil law countries, the law with respect to revocability is
different from the common law rules on the subject. In these civil law
11. See, e.g., Jerome Hall, Comparative Law and Social Theory 5 (1963) ("Presum-
ably, comparative legal research implies that there is important knowledge to be ac-
quired which cannot be had in any other way.").
12. Principles, supra note 7, art. 2.1. For a discussion of the formation of contracts
without a process of offer and acceptance, see 1 Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Con-
tracts § 1.12 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1993).
13. Professor Murray indicated that "the CISG directive to distinguish invitations
from offers is unreliable and confusing." John Edward Murray, Jr., Murray on Con-
tracts § 152(A)(3) (3d ed. 1990).
14. The word "apparently" is used because there is a dispute imong CISG experts
as to whether the requirement of a price term in Article 14 of CISG is satisfied by
Article 55, which imposes a term based on "the price generally charged" in the event
"a contract has been validly concluded but does not expressly or implicitly fix or make
provision for determining the price." CISG, supra note 5, art. 55. There are those
who think that this provision bootstraps Article 14. G. Eorsi, in C.M. Bianca & M.J.
Bonnell, Commentary on the International Sales Law 132, 141-44 (1987). There are
those who think that Articles 14 and 55 contradict each other. Fritz Enderlein & Die-
trich Maskow, International Sales Law 85 (1992). The opinion has also been ex-
pressed that the price question is a question of validity governed by domestic law.
Honnold, supra note 6, 137.4-.8. It has, however, been contended that Article
14(1) contains its own validity term to the effect that a price term is indispensable.




countries, an offeror is held to the promise to keep the offer open; the
power of acceptance created by an offer cannot be revoked during the
period that the offeror has said it will remain open.15 Even if no time
at all has been stated, under these legal systems the offer when made
is not revocable for a reasonable time. CISG provides in Article 16
that an offeror cannot revoke "if [the offer] indicates, whether by stat-
ing a fixed time for acceptance or otherwise, that it is irrevocable."
The stating of a fixed time may raise an inference of irrevocability
during that period.' 6 The language of the Article is intentionally am-
biguous, being based on compromise between advocates of different
systems.'7 Principles continues this ambiguity.18 The offeror, how-
ever, is always free to avoid such an ambiguity by employing clear
language of revocability.
Traditionally, the common law has required that all offers be revo-
cable unless a promise to the contrary is supported by consideration,
or formerly (and still in some jurisdictions) a seal. Today, however,
for the sale of goods, the U.C.C. section 2-205 provides:
An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed writing
which gives assurance that it will be held open needs no considera-
tion to be irrevocable for a reasonable time or during a stated time
but in no event for a time exceeding three months; but such term on
a form supplied by the offeree must be separately signed by the
offeror.1
9
New York has a similar statute, dating before the adoption of the
U.C.C., that is not limited to "merchants." Similarly, the UNIDROIT
provision applies to commercial transactions generally and not merely
to goods. There is thus convergence between a common law statute
and a United Nations Convention to which the United States is a
party and also with Principles. Yet, the provisions differ primarily as
to their formal requirements and as to the nature of the language that
will create irrevocability.
On the question of the effective moment of an acceptance when the
parties' communications are not contemporaneous, CISG and Princi-
15. Formation of Contracts, supra note 9, at 109; see also WJ. Wagner, Some
Problems of Revocation and Termination of Offers, 38 Notre Dame Law. 138, 138
(1962) ("In civil law systems, as a rule, offers are firm as a matter of law, or, if not,
they may be made irrevocable easily by a mere declaration by the offeror. In the
common law, the requirement of consideration renders such an approach
impossible.").
16. Enderlein and Maskow, both civil law scholars, agree. "In interpreting the
intention of a party ... the origin of the parties is also to be taken into consideration.
If both come from the Anglo-American legal order then, in the case of the mere
statement of a time limit for acceptance, a court... would come to the conclusion that
the offer is not irrevocable." Enderlein & Maskow, supra note 14, at 90.
17. See Honnold, supra note 6, 143-.2; Eorsi, in Bianca & Bonell, supra note
14, at 157-58.
18. Principles, supra note 7, art. 2.4(2)(a).
19. U.C.C. § 2-205 (12th ed. 1990).
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ples take a position contrary to the traditional common law mailbox
rule. The interrelationship among the three rules needs to be ex-
amined. Under CISG and Principles, an offer becomes irrevocable
when an acceptance is dispatched,2" but the acceptance is effective
only when and if it reaches the offeror.21 Article 22 of the Convention
and Article 2.10 of Principles both provide that: "An acceptance may
be withdrawn if the withdrawal reaches the offeror before or at the
same time as the acceptance would have become effective." These
provisions represent a series of compromises between common law
and civil law notions.
As stated above, in many civil law countries, offers are generally
irrevocable for a stated or reasonable time. This rule favoring the of-
feree contrasts with the common law's general pro-offeror rule per-
mitting revocation of offers. To balance the common law's bias
toward offerors on the issue of revocation, the common law developed
the mailbox rule, which shortens the period in which an offer may be
revoked. To balance the civil law's bias toward offerees on the issue
of revocability, the civil law developed a rule favoring the offeror on
the question of when an acceptance takes effect. The Convention ap-
proximates the common law view on the question of revocability and
the civil law view on the question of the time of acceptance.22
Professor Murray has constructed a worst-case scenario pursuant to
which these CISG (and now also Principles) rules can be manipulated
for speculation. Under this scenario the offeree may dispatch an ac-
ceptance by mail, thus making the offer irrevocable-if it was not ir-
revocable to start with. The offeree can later overtake the letter of
acceptance with a withdrawal. During this period the offeree can
speculate without risk. This is doubtless true; but in today's world,
with its deteriorating postal systems, and its increasingly sophisticated
means of electronic communication, it is seldom that offers are made
in speculative matters by mail. Furthermore, among the factors that
go into determining whether an offer has been duly accepted within a
reasonable time is the rapidity of the means of communication used
by the offeror.2 It may also be noted that under the rules of the Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts there is a similar ability to speculate
with irrevocable offers.24 It is true, however, that under CISG and
Principles there is an expansion of the grounds for irrevocability and
therefore an expansion of situations in which the offeree can speculate
without risk.
20. CISG, supra note 5, art. 16(1); Principles, supra note 7, art. 2.4(1).
21. CISG, supra note 5, art. 18(2); Principles, supra note 7, art. 2.6(2). This provi-
sion, of course, does not affect acceptances that are properly made by performance
rather than by promise. CISG, supra note 5, art. 18(3); Principles, supra note 7, art.
2.6(3).
22. See Honnold, supra note 6, TT1 157-63.
23. Principles, supra note 7, art. 2.7.




Speculation with offers is, as Professor Murray notes, frowned on by
the Restatement (Second) because it is a manifestation of bad faith.25
One of the improvements in Principles over CISG rules is Article 1.7,
which imposes on the contracting parties a non-derogable duty to "act
in accordance with good faith and fair dealing in international
trade."26 Attempts to mandate such an obligation in CISG were un-
successful, although a vague formulation was adopted. CISG provides
that "[i]n the interpretation of this Convention, regard has to be had
to ... the observance of good faith in international trade." 27 This
provision carefully avoids saying that an obligation of good faith and
fair dealing exists in every contract. Rather, the Convention must be
interpreted in the light of a standard of good faith. Principles requires
the contracting parties to act in good faith. Whether the two formula-
tions are substantively different is a matter about which scholars can
reasonably disagree.'
The civil law concept of culpa in contrahendo finds its way into the
Convention.29 Thus, the parties must act in good faith in the course of
their negotiations.3" Although the concept is not part of the common
law, American courts frequently replicate results similar to those
available under the civil law through the utilization of concepts such
as fraudulent non-disclosure, equitable estoppel and promissory es-
toppel. The time is ripe for a thorough reexamination of the common
law of the United States in the light of this doctrine and its acceptance
as a principle of international commercial contracts.
Related to the obligation to negotiate in good faith is the obligation
to respect the confidentiality of information given during the course of
negotiations. Not all information is deemed confidential; it is confi-
dential if the party revealing the information requests confidentiality
25. Murray, supra note 13, at 882 (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 41
(1979) ("particularly ill. 8")). The obligation of good faith and fair dealing is more
broadly stated in § 205 of the Restatement (Second).
26. Illustration 1 to Principles Article 1.7 applies the obligation of good faith in an
offer and acceptance context. The illustration could also have been resolved in the
same way by application of Article 2.8, which extends deadlines falling on a non-
business day to the next business day.
27. CISG, supra note 5, art. 7(1).
28. One commentary expresses the opinion that there is no distinction between
utilizing a standard of good faith in interpreting the Convention and in administering
the contract. "Observance of the principle of good faith means to display such conduct
as is normal among businessmen." Enderlein & Maskow, supra note 14, at 56.
29. The classic English language article on the subject is Friedrich Kessler & Edith
Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith, and Freedom of Contract: A
Comparative Study, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 401 (1964). The concept has been invoked in
American scholarly writing with some frequency. Fifteen documents in WVestlaw's
JLR database make reference to it in the 1990s. The most thorough of these discus-
sions is Nicola W. Palmieri, Good Faith Disclosures Required During Precontractual
Negotiations, 24 Seton Hall L. Rev. 70, 201-13 (1993).
30. Principles, supra note 7, art. 2.15.
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or where circumstances indicate that confidentiality is required by
principles of good faith and fair dealing. Disclosure of such informa-
tion (or its appropriation) is forbidden and can result in an action for
damages or restitution.31 American case law in purely domestic cases
is sparse on this question, but one of Justice Traynor's superb opinions
supports the UNIDROIT Principle.32
IV. BATTLE OF THE FORMS
The "battle of the forms" receives innovative and generally sound
treatment in Principles. What the U.C.C. deals with in one section,
the newer document addresses in three sections. The first deals with
additional or different terms in a "custom-made" acceptance, 33 and
the second governs the use of a pre-printed standard form as an ac-
ceptance of the other party's standard form.3 4 The third deals with
written confirmations.3 5 The custom-made acceptance receives basi-
cally the same treatment as in CISG. The battle of the forms, how-
ever, is solved by a "knock-out" principle. A term on a printed form
will be part of the contract only to the extent that both party's forms
agree to the substance of the term. Either party can, in advance, or,
without undue delay, after the exchange of forms, declare to the other
party that it36 does not intend to be bound by a contract formed under
the knock-out rule. The commentary indicates that the inclusion *f
such a declaration in a standard-form offer or acceptance would not
ordinarily be a sufficient declaration of intent not to be bound. If a
written confirmation of a contract previously made is sent by one
party to the other, an additional or different term becomes part of the
31. Id. art. 2.16.
32. Ward v. Taggart, 336 P.2d 534, 538 (Cal. 1959) (In Bank) (allowing quasi-con-
tractual recovery for appropriation of an opportunity). But see Cronin v. National
Shawmut Bank, 27 N.E.2d 717, 721-22 (Mass. 1940) (allowing no recovery for the
value of work product in formulating an offer, the ideas for which the offeree gave to
another for appropriation; however, the offer was probably not made in confidence).
33. Principles, supra note 7, art. 2.11. There is precedent for treating tailor-made
contractual terms differently from standardized terms propounded by one party. For
example, Article 3(1) of the European Community Directive on Unfair Contract
Terms provides: "A contractual term which has not been individually negotiated shall
be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a signifi-
cant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations under the contract, to the detri-
ment of the consumer." EEC Directive 93/13, art. 3(1), 1993 O.J. 29; Meryll Dean,
Legislation: Unfair Contract Terms: The European Approach, 56 Mod. L. Rev. 581,
583-84 (1993); see also infra text accompanying notes 39-47.
34. Principles, supra note 7, art. 2.22.
35. Id. art. 2.12.
36. Unlike CISG, the Restatement (Second), and the U.C.C., Principles is gender
neutral. Also, where the customary spelling of words differs in the United Kingdom
and the United States, Principles uses the spelling of the Queen's English. The only
official text is in English.
37. Principles, supra note 7, art. 2.22 cmt. 3 & illus. 2.
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contract unless it materially alters the contract or the recipient of the
confirmation objects to the term. 38
A task force in the United States is working on a revision of Article
2 of the U.C.C.. Drafts of a revised Section 2-207 have been circu-
lated in the legal community. 39 The CISG solution has found no sup-
port and should not be supported.'0
The Principles solution, however, deserves serious consideration. It
has its weaknesses, but the bold stroke of differentiating a negotiated
text from a standard text should be replicated in the U.C.C.. The bulk
of the case law dealing with the present text of Section 2-207 deals
with standard forms. The exceptional cases where a tailored accept-
ance implicates U.C.C. section 2-207 ought to have separate treatment
because they involve traditional problems of the manifestation of as-
sent by negotiation, that is, by expressions of intention. 1
There is a second and more profound rationale, however, for sepa-
rate treatment. The "battle of the forms" does not deal with negotia-
tion but with strategic bombardment. The swapping of conflicting
forms cannot be regarded as expressions of intention in the traditional
sense. Their analysis should be separated from the framework of offer
and acceptance because the concepts within that framework have
proved utterly incapable of providing acceptable solutions to the
problems created by the battle of the forms. The result under the
U.C.C. has been chaos.4 2 Professor Gilmore aptly described the pro-
vision as "abominable," a "complete disaster," and a "miserable, bun-
gled patched-up-job."43 The circulated draft that has been preferred
by the Drafting Committee to revise Article 2 of the U.C.C. is a vast
38. Id. art. 2.13.
39. See Symposium, Ending the "Battle of tie Forms": A Symposium on the Revi-
sion of Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 49 Bus. Law. 1019-80 (1994).
40. Under CISG, a purported acceptance that contains non-material variations
from the offer is an acceptance unless the offeror objects. If the offeror objects, no
contract is formed. CISG, supra note 5, art. 19(2). As defined in Article 19(3) of
CISG, almost all conceivable variations are material.
The CISG provision was rightly criticized as inadequate by Professor Murray. Mur-
ray, supra note 13, § 152. His criticism, however, was based on the inadequacy of the
provision as applied to the battle of the forms. For more extended criticism, see
Christine Moccia, Note, The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods and the "Battle of the Forms," 13 Fordham Int'l LiJ. 649 (1989-
90).
Although the rule in Principles is basically the same as Article 19 of CISG, there is
a slight language change in subdivision 2, and subdivision 3 has been reduced to com-
mentary and somewhat modified. Principles, supra note 7, art. 2.11.
41. See Construction Aggregates Corp. v. Hewitt-Robins, Inc., 404 F.2d 505, 507-
08 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 921 (1969). In Construction Aggregates, the
negotiations took place by letters and telephone conversations. The court's analysis
intelligently avoided the application of U.C.C. § 2-207. Id. at 510.
42. See John E. Murray, Jr., The Chaos of the "Battle of the Forms". Sohtions, 39
Vand. L. Rev. 1307, 1309 (1986).
43. Letter from Professor Grant Gilmore to Professor Robert S. Summers (Sep-
tember 10, 1980), in Richard E. Speidel et al., Sales: Teaching Materials 93-94 (1987).
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improvement, but needs more work.4 A major flaw in the current
draft is that it fails to deal separately with a negotiated series of spe-
cially crafted written communications. Another is that it does not give
sufficient protection to an offeror who does not want to contract ex-
cept on its own terms. Principles takes these two issues into account.
UNIDROIT took precisely the bold step that was necessary by sep-
arating its provision on the battle of the forms from its rules governing
offer and acceptance and inserted its solution as the last of four Arti-
cles dealing with standard forms.45 The first of these is a provision
defining what is meant by the words "standard terms" and providing
that, in general, "standard terms," whether on a printed form or incor-
porated by reference, binding on the parties.46 The second of these
provides that a "surprising" standard term is ineffective unless it is
expressly accepted by the party adhering to the term.47 This in es-
sence replicates one aspect of the U.C.C.'s approach to unconsciona-
bility that is designed for "the prevention of oppression and unfair
surprise. The other provision with respect to standard terms is the
obvious rule that if there is a conflict between a standard term and an
individually agreed term the latter prevails. 49
V. WRITING REQUIREMENTS AND PAROL EVIDENCE
As is the case under CISG, there is no statute of frauds or parol
evidence rule in Principles.5" The parties, however, are free to adopt a
merger clause 51 and to stipulate that oral modifications or rescissions
are prohibited;52 the latter stipulation is the equivalent of a privately
In Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161, 1165 (6th Cir. 1972), the court
said:
In reviewing this determination by the District Court, we are aware of the
problems which courts have had in interpreting Section 2-207. This section
of the UCC has been described as a "murky bit of prose," Southwest Engi-
neering Co. v. Martin Tractor Co., 205 Kan. 684, 694, 473 P.2d 18, 25 (1970),
as "not too happily drafted," Roto-Lith Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d
497, 500 (1st Cir. 1962), and as "one of the most important, subtle, and diffi-
cult in the entire Code, and well it may be said that the product as it finally
reads is not altogether satisfactory." Duesenberg & King, Sales and Bulk
Transfers under the Uniform Commercial Code, (Vol 3, Bender's Uniform
Commercial Code Service) § 3.03, at 3-12 (1969).
44. See Symposium, supra note 39, at 1019-80.
45. Principles, supra note 7, art. 2.19-.22.
46. Id. art. 2.19.
47. Id. art. 2.20.
48. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (12th ed. 1990) (emphasis supplied). Principles deals
with oppression in Article 3.10 entitled "Gross Disparity." Principles, supra note 7,
art. 3.10.
49. Principles, supra note 7, art. 2.21. Accord Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 203(d) & cmt. f (1979) (stating the principle that negotiated terms trump standard-
ized terms).
50. Principles, supra note 7, art. 1.2.
51. Id. art. 2.17.
52. Id. art. 3.18.
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enacted statute of frauds. In the course of negotiations either party
may make it clear to the other that it does not intend to be bound
until a final writing is prepared and signed. The party's expression to
that effect will be honored. As an apparent exception to the general
rule of contractual freedom adopted by Principles,53 a merger clause
cannot effectively bar parol evidence for the purpose of interpreting a
writing. 54
VI. VALIDITY
While CISG states that it is not concerned with the validity of con-
tracts, chapter 3 of Principles is entitled "Validity.""5 It, however, dis-
claims any coverage of capacity of parties, authority of agents, or
public policy. These are left to domestic law.56 It expressly provides,
however, that neither consideration nor causa are required for the
valid formation of a contract.5 7
A. Existing Impossibility
It has been the rule in some civil law systems and a sometime dic-
tum in common law cases and literature that if an agreement is impos-
sible to perform at the outset, and this fact is unknown to both parties,
the agreement is void.58 These statements are usually made in a con-
text where goods have perished or never existed.59 This rule is dis-
carded6" along with another obsolete rule that one cannot contract to
53. Id. arts. 1.1, 1.5.
54. See the last sentence of Principles Article 2.17 and comment 3 to Article 4.3.
55. CISG, supra note 5, art. 4(a). This statement can be accepted only if the term
"validity" is given a narrow construction. In some sense of the word, topics such as
the timely acceptance of an offer and definiteness of terms are concerned with valid-
ity. See also supra note 14.
56. Principles, supra note 7, art. 3.1 & cmt.
57. Id. art. 3.3. Article 3.3 uses the French term cause rather than the Latin term
causa.
58. It is enshrined in Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 266 (1979). The cita-
tions in the reporter's notes thereto mostly involve cases decided on other grounds,
such as mutual mistake or supervening impossibility.
59. See Jan Z. Krasnowiecki, Sale of Non-Existent Goods: A Problem in the The-
ory of Contracts, 34 Notre Dame Law. 358, 358 (1959); Barry Nicholas, Rules and
Terms-Civil Law and Common Law, 48 Tul. L. Rev. 946, 966-72 (1974). The com-
mon law cases usually find that one party or the other, usually the seller, has impliedly
warranted the existence of the goods or other subject matter that is impossible to
deliver or that there has been negligence by the promisor. See, e.g., In re Zellmer's
Estate, 82 N.W.2d 891 (Wis. 1957) (promise to maintain a life insurance policy that
had already lapsed); McRae v. Commonwealth Disposals Comm'n, 84 C.L.R. 377, 386
(Austl. 1951) (sale of nonexistent ship).
60. If, however, the general criteria for avoidance for mistake are present, the
contract may be avoided on the basis of a mistaken belief that the goods are available.
Principles, supra note 7, art. 3.5. cmt. 2, illus. 1.
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sell that which one does not own 61 -a rule that had made short-selling
impossible.62
B. Mutual Mistake
The rule governing mutual mistake is, in substance, not unlike the
rule generally stated in the United States.63 In addition, a unilateral
mistake of a serious kind is grounds for avoidance if the other party
"caused the mistake, or knew or ought to have known of the mistake
and it was contrary to reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing
to leave the mistaken party in error."64 A serious unilateral mistake is
also grounds for avoidance if the other party, however innocent, had
not yet acted in reliance on the contract. 65 This is in accord with re-
cent rulings in the United States.6 6 Because the ability to avoid a con-
tract for mistake can be a the basis for grave attacks on the stability of
contracts, Principles provides safeguards against the abuse of the doc-
trine. Mistaken parties are responsible for their own negligence and
are responsible for risks generally assumed to be taken by contracting
parties.67 An interesting provision states that avoidance for mistake
will not be allowed where the party under the mistake has another
remedy (e.g., breach of warranty).68 There is no rule concerning the
reformation of a writing for mutual mistake. There is no need for
such a rule in view of the free admissibility of parol evidence to estab-
lish the intended meaning of a writing.69
C. Fraud and Duress
Principles paints with a broad brush. Fraud is dealt with in one
page.70 Duress, under the heading of "Threat," is given a few more
lines than fraud.7 Aside from their brevity, the themes and solutions
are familiar to common law lawyers.72 There is one startling devia-
61. Id. art. 3.3.
62. See John Randolph Dos Passos, A Treatise on the Law of Stock-Brokers and
Stock-Exchanges 393-406 (1882).
63. Principles, supra note 7, art. 3.5(1).
64. Id. art. 3.5(1)(a).
65. Id.
66. Cf. John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 9-27 (3d
ed. 1987) ("Today avoidance is generally allowed if two conditions concur: 1) en-
forcement of the contract against the mistaken party would be oppressive, or, at least,
result in an unconscionably unequal exchange of values and 2) rescission would im-
pose no substantial hardship on the other.").
67. Principles, supra note 7, arts. 3.5(2), 3.6.
68. Id. art. 3.7.
69. See supra text accompanying note 48.
70. Principles, supra note 7, art. 3.8.
71. Id. art. 3.9. However, there are a number of other provisions (Articles 3.14-
.20) dealing with all grounds of avoidance for initial invalidity and providing for such
matters as notice, ratification ("confirmation") and damages.
72. Compare id. art. 3.9 illus. 1 (stating that a contract may be avoided if an unjus-
tified threat is utilized to obtain assent) with Capps v. Georgia Pac. Corp., 453 P.2d
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tion. A threat by the members of a professional basketball team to
strike at a very vulnerable point in the season is given as an illustra-
tion of duress.73 When reading this document, one needs constantly
to remind oneself that Principles is subject to the mandatory laws of
the country whose law governs the transaction; consequently, the va-
lidity of the illustration in any given country is dependent on whether
the strike threat is protected under the applicable labor law.
D. "Gross Disparity," Unconscionability and Lesion
One of the more interesting Principles provisions is entitled "Gross
Disparity." Here civil law concepts of lesion merge with the common
law notion of unconscionability. A somewhat oversimplified overview
of the civil law concept is that an excessive or inadequate price is
deemed a lesion if the disparity between price and value is fifty per-
cent or more. This disparity is grounds for avoiding the contract
whether or not the other party's conduct can be regarded as preda-
tory.74 Civil codes vary, and the French and Louisiana Codes restrict
the doctrine to contracts dealing with immoveables.75 Unconsciona-
bility is a more variegated concept, but one of its core applications is
the nonenforcement of a contract that is the product of some degree
of exploitation by one party resulting in overall imbalance of the
exchange.
Under Principles, a party may obtain avoidance or reformation
("adaptation") of any contract or term giving the other party an exces-
sive advantage. The court must take into account whether the other
party took "unfair advantage" of the moving party's vulnerability.76
Exemption clauses are not dealt with under the heading of validity,
but are dealt with under "performance." We are used to thinking
about exemption clauses in terms of their per se invalidity in some
circumstances. Under Principles, exemptions are not invalid and
935, 938 (Or. 1969) (holding that in a case where the mortgagor threatened non-pay-
ment, knowing the mortgagee was in financial trouble; whether settlement was ob-
tained through economic duress is a question of fact determined by the availability of
other courses of action available to party claiming duress). See generally John P. Daw-
son, Duress Through Civil Litigation (pts. 1 & 2), 45 Mich. L. Rev. 571, 679 (1947)
("[A] settlement induced by threat of immediate issuance of execution under a valid,
final money judgment cannot be duress .... ").
73. Principles, supra note 7, art. 3.9 cmt. 3, illus. 2.
74. This is not true of all civil law states. For example, Article 17 of the Mexican
Civil Code provides:
When any person taking advantage of the supreme ignorance, notorious in-
experience or extreme poverty of another, obtains an excessive profit which
is evidently disproportionate to the obligations assumed by him, the person
damaged has the right to demand the rescission of the contract, and if this be
impossible, an equitable reduction in his obligation.
Civil Code [C.C.D.F.I art. 17 (Mex.).
75. See Saul Litvinoff, Vices of Consent, Error, Fraud, Duress and an Epilogue on
Lesion, 50 La. L. Rev. 1, 107-13 (1989).
76. Principles, supra note 7, art. 3.10(1)(b).
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there is no general principle about the conscionability of terms of the
agreement, except for the provisions on hardship and good faith. Ar-
ticle 7.1.6 of Principles is unlike U.C.C. section 2-302 in that the ques-
tion of whether the exemption clause will be sustained is one of
unconscionability of application rather than a question of invalidity.
Two different kinds of clauses are encompassed in the concept: a
clause that limits liability and a clause that "permits one party to
render performance substantially different from what the other party
reasonably expected."7 7 Official comments to the provision indicate
that contract clauses that stipulate fixed sums, ceilings, percentage of
performance, retention of deposits and buy-out clauses are means of
limiting liability and therefore governed by the provision.78 A clause
that permits a party to substitute a substantially different performance
is illustrated by a case where a tour operator promises luxury hotels
but reserves the right to substitute accommodations if the circum-
stances require.79 Such clauses are not made invalid, but "may not be
invoked"80 if it would be grossly unfair to do so. This provision, in
American perspective, provides a rule against the unconscionable ap-
plication of a clause as is found in Section 2-309 of the U.C.C. on the
question of the termination of sales contracts, 81 as opposed to a clause
that is unconscionable at the outset of a contract as contemplated by
U.C.C. section 2-302.11
E. Non-Derogability of Invalidity Principles
Although most of the provisions of Principles are derogable, those
concerning fraud, threat and gross disparity are not. It would be a
violation of the doctrine of good faith to attempt to disclaim them by
contract.8 3
VII. INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS
CISG provisions concerning the interpretation of contracts are lean.
Principles contains a more expansive chapter called "Interpretation,"
which in a general way is in accord with CISG. The most notable
departure is the rule that the primary rule of interpretation is that a
contract "shall be interpreted according to the common intention of
the parties."8 4 In contrast, CISG has no provision with respect to in-
terpretation of "a contract." Its provisions govern statements made
by "a party." The common intention of the parties is also adopted by
77. Id. art. 7.1.6.
78. Id. art. 7.1.6 crnts. 2, 3.
79. Id. art. 7.1.6 cmt. 2, illus. 1.
80. Id. art. 7.1.6.
81. See U.C.C. § 2-309 cunt. 8 (12th ed. 1990).
82. Id. § 2-302.
83. Principles, supra note 7, art. 3.19 cmt.
84. Id. art. 4.1.
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the Restatement (Second) of Contracts as its first rule of interpreta-
tion.8 5 The Restatement rule, however, is imbedded in a tradition that
severely restricts testimony by the parties of their subjective inten-
tions. Principles, however, disclaims any limitation on evidence of the
parties' intentions.8 6 Although in many civil law States parties are not
competent to testify as witnesses, their unsworn statements may be
elicited and evaluated as evidence.' Consequently, in the actual deci-
sion of a dispute, significantly different results could be obtained
under Principles from those obtainable by utilization of the Restate-
ment rules.
If the common intention cannot be determined, Principles slips into
the reasonableness mode familiar to us.' As is the case with CISG
and the U.C.C., course of dealing, course of performance and usages
are relevant circumstances to be taken into account in the interpreta-
tion of contracts and statements of the parties.8 9 In addition, a provi-
sion on interpretation makes explicit once again that the
interpretation process must take into account "the preliminary negoti-
ations between the parties."" As indicated above, the parties cannot
derogate from this rule by agreeing in a merger clause to bar such
evidence.91
VIII. CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS
Legal theorists have long distinguished between the interpretation
of language (meaning) and its legal effect (construction).92 While the
existence of such a dichotomy is intellectually coherent and convinc-
ing, its consistent application to real-world contracts appears to be im-
possible. A similar distinction is made in Principles. Chapter 4 deals
with "Interpretation" and chapter 5 deals with "Content." It is diffi-
cult, and maybe impossible, to discern how the division was crafted.
Omitted terms are regulated in chapter 493 and implied terms in chap-
ter 5.94 Yet, all of the fact patterns used to illustrate implied terms
involve, in my analysis, omitted terms.95 Other provisions in chapter 5
clearly deal with imposed terms such as a duty to cooperate reason-
85. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 201(1) & illus. 1, 3 (1979).
86. See supra text accompanying note 48.
87. Schlesinger, supra note 4, at 428-31.
88. Principles, supra note 7, arts. 4.1(2), 4.2(2); see also id. arts. 4.4-.8 (providing
other rules of interpretation and gap-filling).
89. Id. art. 4.3. (distinguishing between usages and trade terms. The former are
applicable by virtue of Article 1.8, while trade terms have, according to the official
comment, broader relevance.).
90. Id. art. 4.3(a).
91. See supra text accompanying note 52.
92. See e.g., 3 Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 534 (1960) (discussing the
subject extensively).
93. Principles, supra note 7, art. 4.8.
94. Id. arts. 5.1., 5.2.
95. Id. art. 5.2 illus. 1-3.
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ably with the other contracting party,96 the imposition of a warranty of
reasonable quality of every performance (akin to the common law no-
tion of workmanlike performance),97 the method of filling an open
price term (much as in U.C.C. section 2-305),.9 and the giving of rea-
sonable notice of termination of a contract of indefinite duration
(much as required by U.C.C. section 2-309).99
Two provisions of chapter 5 deal with the distinction made by the
French between obligation de rdsultat and obligation de moyens' 0° -
that is, between an obligation to achieve a given result and an obliga-
tion use reasonable (or best) efforts to achieve a given result. This is a
distinction to which the common law, perhaps, has paid insufficient
attention;1 1 but this lack of attention is understandable. The common
law regards the question as a matter of interpretation of the con-
tract.' 2 French law regards the two types of contract as distinct in
nature.1 0 3 Because the French law of contract looks to fault as an es-
sential element of breach, in the first kind of obligation, the promisor
has the burden of proving the non-existence of fault; in the second
type the burden of proof of breach is on the promisee.'" Under Prin-
ciples, however, all liability (subject only to force majeure) is no-fault
liability. 0 5 Therefore the distinction has lost its juridical significance,
and devotion of approximately six pages in a slim volume of 215 sub-
stantive pages seems to pay disproportionate attention to the topic of
whether a contract obligation is to attain a specific result or to attempt
to attain that result.
96. Id. art. 5.3.
97. Id. art. 5.6.
98. Id. art. 5.7. As indicated above, a price term is not an essential term under
Principles. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
99. Principles, supra note 7, art. 5.8.
100. See Barry Nicholas, The French Law of Contract 50-56 (2d ed. 1992).
101. A recent significant treatment is Timothy Davis, The Illusive Warranty of
Workmanlike Performance: Constructing a Conceptual Framework, 72 Neb. L. Rev.
981 (1993).
102. See, e.g., Tamarac Dev. Co. v. Delamater, Freund & Assocs., 675 P.2d 361, 365
(Kan. 1984) ("The work performed by architects and engineers is an exact science;
that performed by doctors and lawyers is not. A person who contracts with an archi-
tect or engineer for a building of a certain size and elevation has a right to expect an
exact result.").
103. The common law regards the distinction as important for different reasons
than the French. Where the obligation is not to achieve a specific result, but to exer-
cise a standard of due care, the question often raised is whether a breach is a contrac-
tual breach or a tort. See Davis, supra note 97, at 1021-25 (focusing on construction
cases). Physician cases are discussed in Thomas M. Woodbury, Note, Physicians and
Surgeons-Sullivan v. O'Connor: A Liberal View of the Contractual Liability of Phy-
sicians and Surgeons, 54 N.C. L. Rev. 885, 887 (1976).
104. Nicholas, supra note 96, at 53-54.
105. Principles, supra note 7, art. 7.1.1 & cmt. Besides force majeure, the comment
lists two other kinds of justified nonperformance: interference by the other party and




IX. PERFORMANCE AND BREACH
One of the more interesting chapters of Principles is entitled "Per-
formance." For one thing, its content is far more wide-ranging than
comparable chapters in common law writings, where many of the
same topics are considered in other chapters under headings such as
"Indefiniteness" 0 6 and "Conditions. ' 10 7 From another perspective, it
contains detailed provisions with respect to payment in an interna-
tional context that are not commonly found in works on domestic law.
This kind of provision should usefully fill lacunae in our law of con-
tracts. It also contains a subchapter on "Hardship" that appears to
introduce radical deviations from the common law.
A. Payment
Unless otherwise agreed, payment is due at the obligor's place of
business.10m Payment may be made in any manner customary at the
place payment is due; payment made by check or other instrument is
conditioned on its being honored.109 In international trade, payment
is frequently made by transfer of funds from the obligor's financial
institution to the obligee's account. Subject to contrary instructions
from the obligee, payment may be made to any account of the obligee
which the latter has made known to the obligor. When the transfer to
such an account becomes effective, the obligor is discharged. 10 The
official commentary details the confusion that has surrounded the is-
sue of whether and when the obligor is discharged in the event the
obligor's account is debited but the funds do not reach the obligee.
Here the obligee's bank is treated as the obligee's agent."'
B. Currency
The fluctuation of currencies and the non-convertibility of certain
currencies create numerous problems in international trade. It is not
uncommon for parties in two foreign States to stipulate a price in
United States dollars or Swiss francs or other internationally
respected currency. The dollar or franc may be intended as the cur-
rency of account rather than as the currency in which actual payment
is intended to be made. Unless the contract provides otherwise, even
if the price is stated in another currency, it may be made in the cur-
rency of the State where payment is made, provided that the currency
106. See, e.g., id. art. 6.1.1 (time of performance); id. art. 6.1.2 (performance at one
time or in installments); id. art. 6.1.6 (place of performance); id. art. 6.1.11 (costs of
performance). These provisions are consistent with the common law in the United
States.
107. Id. art. 6.1.4 (order of performance).
108. Id. art. 6.1.6.
109. Id. art. 6.1.7.
110. Id. art. 6.1.8.
111. Id. art. 6.1.8 cmt.2.
1994]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
is convertible and the parties have not otherwise agreed. 2 If it is not
convertible, payment must be made in the currency stated in the con-
tract.113 If this should prove impossible because of exchange regula-
tions or other force majeure, payment must be made in the currency of
the State where payment is made.1 4 If payment is not timely, the
obligee has the choice between the rate of exchange at the time pay-
ment was due and the rate at the time of payment.1 5
C. Costs of Performance
Unless otherwise agreed, an agreed price is inclusive of all the cred-
itor's costs." 6 If a price for services is agreed upon, the travel ex-
penses of the party rendering the services are included.' 7 Of course,
contrary agreement is possible.
D. Imputation of Payment
The Performance chapter has a provision on the imputation of pay-
ment. Within limits, the obligee, when making payment, may dictate
to which of several obligations the payment must be allocated." 8 The
limits are that the obligor may in disregard of these instructions, apply
the payment first to expenses, presumably the costs of collection such
as attorneys' fees, and secondly to interest rather than principal. In
the absence of instructions from the obligee, payment is imputed in
accordance with a hierarchy of four criteria; if none of these is applica-
ble, the allocation is made proportionally to all outstanding debts that
the obligee has with the obligor. In general, the imputed allocations
strike this observer as sound.
X. FORCE MAJEURE AND HARDSHIP
The modern common law has developed the concepts of impossibil-
ity and impracticability. The dichotomy in Principles between force
majeure and hardship does not replicate the common law division;
rather, it is based on civil law notions. The obtaining or denial of
licenses and permits is singled out for separate treatment.
A. Licenses and Permits
Four Articles of Principles and extensive commentary is devoted to
the obtaining of governmental permissions-certainly an important
112. Id. art. 6.1.9(1).
113. Id.
114. Id. art. 6.1.9(2).
115. Id. art. 6.1.9(4).
116. Id. art. 6.1.11.
117. Id. art. 6.1.11 illus.




topic in domestic trade and a more complex one in international
trade. Permits may be needed from more than one State; there may
be licensing requirements of which one or both parties may be una-
ware. The burden of applying for any necessary governmental ap-
proval is cast on the party who has its place of business in the State
whose approval is required-only, however, if the other party has no
place of business in the State. 119 In any other case (i.e., when neither
party has, or both parties have, a place of business in the State), the
party whose performance requires permission must take the necessary
measures. 120 Where both parties' performances are subject to the
same approval requirement,12' and neither or both parties have a
place of business in the State, the provisions are silent on the question
of who must apply for the necessary permission.
The party who has the duty to apply for the approval must exercise
best efforts by applying without undue delay and, if reasonable, exer-
cise available processes for appeal if the approval is not obtained. 12
As elsewhere in Principles, there is an emphasis on communication.
Unless the knowledge of the need for approval is generally accessible,
the existence of the need for permission must be disclosed by the
party whose duty it is to obtain it." Failure to disclose is a breach of
the obligation of good faith inherent in all negotiations. 124 Similarly,
if the approval is granted or denied, the applicant must, without undue
delay, notify the other party."2 Failure to notify constitutes a breach
of contract. 126
What are the consequences of refusal of an approval that has been
diligently sought? The text is not totally clear. One reading is that if
the contract is subject to governmental approval, and approval is not
granted, it is as though no contract ever came into being.127 This
makes governmental approval similar to the often criticized common
law concept of a condition precedent to the existence of a contract. 2S
If, however, the lack of approval makes the contract impossible to
perform (e.g., denial of a building permit), the rights of the party are
governed by the rules governing contractual breaches, including the
defense of force majeure.129 If only one term of the contract fails to
119. Id. art. 6.1.14(a).
120. Id. art. 6.1.14(b).
121. See, e.g., Oak Bee Corp. v. N.E. Blankman & Co., 551 N.Y.S.2d 559 (App.
Div. 1990) (concluding that a preliminary subdivision approval is for the benefit of
both parties).
122. Principles, supra note 7, art. 6.1.14 cmt. 4; see also id. art. 6.1.16 cmt. 1.
123. Id. art. 6.1.14 cmt. 2.
124. See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
125. Principles, supra note 7, art. 6.1.15(2).
126. Id. art. 6.1.15 cmt. 5.
127. Id. art. 6.1.17(1).
128. See, e.g., 3 Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 589 (1960) (discussing the
subject at length).
129. Principles, supra note 7, art. 6.1.17 cmt. 2(b).
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receive approval, the contract as a whole survives if it is reasonable to
excise the offending term and regard the balance of the contract as a
transaction the parties would have agreed to if they knew of the
impediment. 3 °
B. Hardship and Impossibility
The provisions on "Hardship" contained in the chapter called "Per-
formance' 131 should be compared with the provision on "Force
Majeure," contained in the chapter on "Non-Performance."1 32  The
rule of force majeure is draconian and unforgiving. Under the rule,
nothing short of total impossibility will excuse non-performance or
partial non-performance. Impracticability will not suffice as an ex-
cuse. Rather, impracticability as well as hardship far short of imprac-
ticability must be tested under the "Hardship" articles.
Hardship alone never forgives non-performance. It instead compels
renegotiation and authorizes courts to "adapt" (reform) the contract
to take the hardship into account. "[A]n alteration amounting to 50%
or more of the cost or the value of the performance is likely to amount
to a 'fundamental' alteration" justifying invocation of the doctrine. 133
One illustration involves a ten-year contract for the sale of uranium at
fixed prices in United States dollars payable in New York. The cur-
rency in the buyer's country declines to one percent of its value
against the value that it had at the time of contracting. The buyer
cannot invoke force majeure.34 Similarly, if the price is increased ten-
fold because some Texans have almost cornered the market, force
majeure is not present. 35 Nonetheless, the buyer may have redress
under the hardship provisions. Renegotiation is compelled if "the
equilibrium of the contract" is "fundamentally altered" by events that
occur or become known after contracting, the events could not rea-
sonably be taken into account, the events are not within the party's
control and the risk was not assumed. 36 Consequently, in the two
illustrations just described a prima facie claim of hardship is made
out. 
1 37
130. Id. art. 6.1.17 cmt. 2(a).
131. Id. arts. 6.2.1-.2.3.
132. Id. art. 7.1.7.
133. Id. art. 6.2.2 cmt. 2.
134. Id. art. 7.1.7 cmt. 1, illus. 1(1). This is not a draconian result if the buyer can
pass the inflationary costs onto the ultimate consumer.
135. Id. illus. 1(3).
136. Id. art. 6.2.2.
137. My conclusion regarding the currency collapse case is supported by illustration
3 to Article 6.2.2, where on similar facts hardship is said to exist. However, the cur-
rency collapse case in illustration 1(1) to Article 7.1.7 dealing with force majeure con-
cludes that the parties have allocated the risk by the payment terms. The two




Compelled renegotiation and judicial reformation of the bargain
are not in the mainstream of the common law. One case of reforma-
tion138 and one case of compelled renegotiation 139 have been the raw
materials for serious scholarly urging of more of the same.140 In a
well-argued article, Professor Speidel has concluded that when a long-
term supply contract is disrupted by changed conditions, "[a]t a mini-
mum, the advantaged party should have a legal duty to negotiate in
good faith. At a maximum, he should have a legal duty to accept an
'equitable' adjustment proposed in good faith by the disadvantaged
party."'' His conclusion approximates the law in countries such as
Argentina, 42 Germany and Italy, 43 and the provisions of Principles.
Professor Spiedel's solution does not receive a great deal of support
from American case law or scholarly literature. One reason for the
difference between the common law and the modem civil law ap-
proach is that the leading common law countries have not suffered
from the unmanageable inflation that has ravaged much of the civil
law world. However, American law should realize that international
trade is different from domestic trade and the modern civil law solu-
tion formulated in Principles deserves support in international trade
disputes. One reason is that sophisticated international trade agree-
ments of long duration typically contain a renegotiation or other ad-
aptation clause that provides flexibility to the relationship' "-so
typical as to perhaps rise to the strength of a usage. The absence of
such a clause may reflect that such a clause has been rejected by one
138. ALCOA v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
139. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 517 F. Supp. 440
(E.D. Va. 1981).
140. See Richard M. Buxbaum, Modification and Adaptation of Contracts: Ameri-
can Legal Developments, in Adaptation and Renegotiation of Contracts in Interna-
tional Trade and Finance 31 (Norbert Horn ed., 1985) [hereinafter Adaptation and
Renegotiation]; Richard E. Speidel, Court-Imposed Price Adjustments Under Long-
Term Supply Contracts, 76 Nw. U. L. Rev. 369 (1981).
141. Speidel, supra note 136, at 404-05.
142. See Haracio A. Grigera Na6n, Adaptation of Contracts: An Argentine Sub-
stantive and Private International Law Outlook, in Adaptation and Renegotiation,
supra note 136, at 55, 58. The author described the doctrine of imprvision stating
that:
If an unforeseen and extraordinary change of circumstances takes place such
that the performance of a party's obligations becomes excessively burden-
some, such party may sue to obtain the contract's termination. The other
party thus sued may try to avoid such a termination by offering, at his ex-
pense, an adequate economic improvement of the obligations; however, it
shall be up to the judge to finally decide the issue.
Id.
143. See Norbert Horn, Changes in Circumstances and the Revision of Contracts in
Some European Laws and in International Law, in Adaptation and Renegotiation,
supra note 136, at 15, 22-23.
144. See Ugo Draetta et al., Breach and Adaptation in International Contracts: An
Introduction to Lex Mercatoria 170-214 (1992); Norbert Horn, Standard Clauses on
Contract Adaptation in International Commerce, in Adaptation and Renegotiation,
supra note 136, at 111.
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or both parties, but is more likely to have been overlooked by unso-
phisticated parties or deliberately omitted by a sophisticated drafter.
In the last two cases, the court should consider the contracts as having
an omitted term and fill the gap with the help of Principles.
XI. NON-PERFORMANCE
"Non-performance" is defined as a failure to perform any obliga-
tions of the contract. 145 This is consistent with common law thinking
and with the provisions of CISG, and departs in a major way from the
civil law of France which differentiates among various kinds of
breaches. Non-performance encompasses defective performance and
late performance. It is not a judgmental term, as the non-performance
may be excused because of prevention by the other party, failure of
constructive condition, or force majeure.
A. Prevention and Cooperation
The doctrine of hindrance or prevention is well established in the
common law.146 A party who has prevented the other party from per-
forming cannot then claim a remedy for breach. The non-perform-
ance is excused both at common law and under Principles.14 7 If the
hindrance merely impedes rather than prevents performance, the ex-
cuse is then prorated. No formula is given, but courts can be expected
to apply this principle to a variety of fact patterns. For example, if
part of the delay in completing a construction project is caused by the
owner's interference or non-performance, the builder's liability for
any delay damages is reduced to that extent. 148
Constructive conditions of cooperation are treated in an article enti-
tled "Withholding Performance.' ' 149 Where parties are to perform si-
multaneously, each party may withhold performance until tender of
performance by the other party. If one party is to perform first, the
other party may withhold performance until the first party has per-
formed. While the official comment indicates that these rules are
based on a civil law concept, they are familiar rules in American con-
tract law.' 5
145. Principles, supra note 7, art. 7.1.1.
146. See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 64, § 11-28, at 486.
147. Principles, supra note 7, art. 7.1.2.
148. Accord Seubert Excavators, Inc. v. Eucon Corp., 871 P.2d 826, 831 (Idaho
1994) ("[A] general contractor cannot recover from its subcontractor for delay under
a liquidated damages clause where the general contractor contributed to the delay by
failing to perform a contractual duty, such as failing to provide adequate
equipment.").
149. Id. art. 7.1.3.




Like CISG, Principles adopts a policy of keeping the contract intact
if at all feasible. It does this by its emphasis on cure, adoption of the
Nachfrist procedure, 151 and by placing limitations on the power of an
aggrieved party to cancel the contract because of breach by the other.
The cure provisions are similar to Articles 37 and 48 of CISG. A
breaching party can promptly notify the other party of its intention to
cure, specifying how and when the cure will be effective. If the offer
to cure is appropriate, and the other party has no "legitimate interest"
in refusing an offer to cure, the aggrieved party must accept the of-
fer;"'52 failure to accept an appropriate offer of cure is a breach and
bars all remedies.' 53 The notice to cure, if appropriate, suspends all
remedies, including a notice of termination that is received before the
notice of cure is sent-certainly a major deviation from the common
law even as it has been liberalized in the U.C.C.. The aggrieved party,
however, may withhold performance pending cure, and after cure can
assert a right to damages to the extent it is not made whole by the
cure.
C. Fundamental Breach
As is the case with CISG, an aggrieved party may terminate a con-
tract for breach only if the breach is "fundamental," or if the breach-
ing party fails to comply with a Nachfrist. This German word refers to
a notice to the breaching party setting a deadline for performance.
The notice will provide an additional period of time to perform upon
expiration of which the aggrieved party may proceed with any of the
remedial provisions available under Principles, including termina-
tion.1 54 The common law provides a similar approach; the major dif-
ference is the starting point; under Principles time is never of the
essence unless the contract makes it so. At common law, the perfect
tender rule for the sale of goods and the default rule as to loan agree-
ments makes time of the essence as a matter of law, unless the parties
stipulate to the contrary. But if, under the common law, time is not of
the essence or timeliness has been waived, the aggrieved party can
make time of the essence by sending a notice to the party in breach. 155
During the additional period most remedies are suspended, but the
151. See infra part XII.C.
152. Principles, supra note 7, art. 7.1.4.
153. Id. cmt. 10.
154. Id. art. 7.1.5. If the allotted additional time is not reasonable the text states
that "it shall be extended to a reasonable length." Id. The use of the passive voice is
confusing. Obviously, the aggrieved party can extend the time for performance. The
most obvious consequence is that if the aggrieved party does not extend it, and a trier
of fact later determines that the period was not reasonable, the originally aggrieved
party has now committed a fundamental breach.
155. See, e.g., Zev v. Merman, 521 N.Y.S.2d 455, 457 (App. Div. 1987), aff'd, 533
N.E.2d 669 (N.Y. 1988) (real property); Schenectady Steel Co. v. Bruno Trimpoli
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aggrieved party may commence an action for damages. The common
law has no name for this kind of notice. It should adopt Nachfrist into
its legal language and make it more widely known. As at common
law, although time is not of the essence, any delay is, generally, a
breach for which damages are assessable.
XII. REMEDIES
The remedial articles of Principles are among its most important
and detailed. Despite the sometimes clashing cultural and conceptual
backgrounds of the drafters, the remedial provisions are realistic,
rather than conceptual in formulation, and appear workable.
A. Specific Performance
Civil law theory has it that specific performance is the aggrieved
party's entitlement. Conceptually, specific performance is not a rem-
edy; rather, the aggrieved party is compelling performance and the
court is an aide in the process of party-compulsion. Only if this is
unavailable, or the aggrieved party elects not to pursue compelled
performance, will the Civilian lawyer think in terms of remedies for
non-performance.156 Even then, "during the pendency of an action
seeking restitution or damages for non-performance, the obligor ordi-
narily may defeat such action by tendering performance, together with
interest (or other damages for the delay) and costs."'1 7 As a practical
matter, if a substitute performance is available from the market, the
rational actor will not pursue specific performance regardless of
whether the actor is operating in a civil law or common law country.
Principles recognizes this. In most respects it formulates a reasonable
compromise between the common law and the civil law approaches to
specific performance. If a debt has been created, the creditor is enti-
tled to payment in the currency in which the debt is to be paid.' 58 This
is consistent with common law practice, but not common law thinking,
which, views specific performance as a remedy apart from judgments
at law. The text of Principles goes further than debt collection in pay-
ment cases. Suppose a buyer is obligated to pay in advance for goods
that are not specially manufactured to the buyer's specifications and
the buyer fails to pay. No common law court would render judgment
for payment of the price. Only a judgment for damages would be
Gen. Constr. Co., 350 N.Y.S.2d 920, 923 (App. Div.), aff'd, 316 N.E.2d 875 (N.Y.
1974) (construction contract); see also U.C.C. § 2-309 cmt. 6 (12th ed. 1990).
156. See Nicholas, supra note 96, at 211; Schlesinger, supra note 4, at 663-67; G.H.
Treitel, Remedies for Breach of Contract: A Comparative Account 43-74 (1988);
John P. Dawson, Specific Performance in France and Germany, 57 Mich. L. Rev. 495,
532 (1959); Charles Szladits, The Concept of Specific Performance in Civil Law, 4 Am.
J. Comp. L. 208, 231-32 (1955).
157. Schlesinger, supra note 4, at 667.
158. Principles, supra note 7, art. 7.2.1.
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given. The commentary indicates that "[e]xceptionally," judgment for
the price "may be excluded,"' 59 and suggests that it may be a usage for
the seller to resell to third parties. This is probably so, but in the
United States, it is a usage in the shadow of the law as the seller is
aware that the court will not grant a judgment for the price. In this
provision Principles may have bent too far toward civil law theory.
The rest of the provisions on specific performance strike a good bal-
ance between common law and civil law. Specific performance is
available unless performance is impossible in law or in fact, where it
would be unreasonably burdensome or expensive, where performance
is easily available from another source, where personal services of the
breaching party would be required, or where performance is not
sought within a reasonable time after the breach.'" Close examina-
tion of these exceptions shows that the proclaimed "general rule" of
specific performance is so undercut by the exceptions that not much
remains. The practical result is that the rules very much resemble the
existing situation in the United States and in civil law countries . 6'
Unlike the rule in common law systems, however, the remedy is not
discretionary. It thus differs from CISG, which allows the court to
refrain from ordering specific performance if it would not do so under
its own domestic law. 62 While it is doubtful that a common law court
would in the near future follow this UNIDROIT principle and loosen
the habitual restrictions on the availability of specific performance, it
should be noted that arbitrators are not under the same constraints
and a good many international trade disputes are arbitrated. Ameri-
can courts have enforced arbitral awards of specific performance on
facts that would not have resulted in such a decree in a court of eq-
uity16 3 and must enforce such awards if they are governed by the
United Nations Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of For-
eign Arbitral Awards. 6 Thus if an arbitral tribunal orders a party to
cure a defect in a construction project, an American court would en-
force that order.165
159. Id. art. 7.2.1 cmt.
160. Id. art. 7.2.2.
161. See Nicholas, supra note 96, at 211. The author stated that:
From the point of view of the French lawyer the creditor's primary recourse
is in principle to have the contract performed, whereas for the Common law-
yer the primary remedy is damages. In practice, it is true . . .[that] the
remedy of specific enforcement is less important than principle suggests, but
the attitude of mind remains.
162. CISG, supra note 5, art. 28.
163. Staklinski v. Pyramid Elec Co., 160 N.E.2d 78, 80 (N.Y. 1959) (ordering rein-
statement of production manager).
164. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (1988).
165. Principles, supra note 7, art. 7.2.3 (governing the ordering of the repair and




A party who has received a decree for specific performance of a
non-monetary obligation is not bound by an election of remedies and
may pursue any other remedy if performance does not take place
within a reasonable time or within any period set by the decree. This
change of remedial choice is possible whether or not the decree could
be enforced by further proceedings. 66
The enforcement mechanism for specific performance is the "judi-
cial penalty." It is a concept that appears to draw from the common
law notion of civil contempt, the French astreinte,67 the German
fine 168 and comparable institutions in other countries. 169 According to
Principles, when the court orders performance it can also direct the
breaching party to pay a penalty should the order not be obeyed. The
penalty is to be paid to the party (French law) unless the mandatory
law of the forum (German law) provides that it be paid to the State.
The penalty is superimposed onto any damages caused by noncompli-
ance with the decree. 7° While the remedy of specific performance is
not discretionary, the imposition of a penalty is discretionary with the
court.' Principles is silent on the question of whether other forms of
coercion or other forms of producing specific performance are also
permissible. For example, in the United States an order for the spe-
cific performance of the transfer of property can be carried out by
appointing a court officer to execute a conveyance if the vendor is
recalcitrant,.7 or the decree itself may transfer title to the property.1 73
Similarly, "German law has developed a great variety of indirect and
less coercive methods of protecting the injured party's right to per-
formance."' 74 Presumably such other methods do not conflict with
Principles, being procedural devices for accomplishing the goal of spe-
cific performance. It is somewhat strange that one method of attain-
ing that goal is singled out.
B. Termination and Restitution
In the event of "fundamental non-performance," the aggrieved
party may "terminate" the contract. Unlike the civil law as effectu-
166. Id. art. 7.2.5.
167. For a discussion of the astreinte, see Schlesinger, supra note 4, at 669-71;
Treitel, supra note 152, at 59-63.
168. The French and German ways of compelling performance are discussed in
Schlesinger, supra note 4, at 667-71.
169. Id.
170. Principles, supra note 7, art. 7.2.4.
171. Id. cmt. 2.
172. Silver v. Ladd, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 219, 228 (1868); Cooley v. Scarlett, 38 II1. 317,
320 (Ill. 1865); Hollander v. Central Metal & Supply Co., 71 A. 442, 444 (Md. 1908);
Calder v. Third Judicial Dist. Court, 273 P.2d 168, 169 (Utah 1954).
173. Goldsworthy v. Dobbins, 243 P.2d 883, 887 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952); 1130 Presi-
dent St. Corp. v. Bolton Realty Corp., 97 N.Y.S.2d 422, 424 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950).




ated in France,175 there is no need to go to court to have the contract
dissolved. Use of the word "termination" may place an obstacle to
understanding. 176 Roughly, the analog in the common law is the rule
that the aggrieved party may cancel' 77 for material breach.'17  How-
ever, the breach must be more than material; "extremely material"
may be a better term. Essentially, unless strict compliance is made of
the essence by the express terms of the contract or usage, 179 non-per-
formance is not fundamental unless it is serious indeed. Moreover, its
serious effect on the other party must be foreseeable."m This is not a
criterion normally enunciated in American law. 8" Yet, the idea of
foreseeability so permeates our system of contract and tort law that it
may be considered an unarticulated premise in our notions of what is
a material breach. Even if the breach is not fundamental, termination
is also available if the breaching party has not complied with the terms
of a reasonable Nachfrist.'s2 Termination also is available in the event
of an anticipatory repudiation or a clear case of prospective inability
to perform.1 3 Termination is never automatic. It takes place by no-
tice.'" As elsewhere in Principles, the commercially understood re-
sponsibility to communicate is recognized and implemented. Also,
throughout the rest of Principles, and as is the case with CISG, the
175. See Treitel, supra note 152, at 323-24.
176. Principles, supra note 7, art. 7.3.1.
177. Terminology in this area is prolific and confusing. The U.C.C. attempts to im-
pose some discipline on the use of the terms "rescission," "termination" and "cancel-
lation," still often used interchangeably: .
"Rescission" is utilized as a term of art to refer to a mutual agreement to
discharge contractual duties. "Termination" refers to the discharge of duties
by the exercise of a power granted by the agreement. "Cancellation" refers
to the putting an end to the contract by reason of a breach by the other
party.
Calamari & Perillo, supra note 64, § 21-2, at 865 (footnotes omitted). CISG utilizes
the term "avoidance" (e.g., Article 49) to describe what Principles calls "termination"
and the UCC calls "cancellation." Principles employs the term "avoidance" in the
context of contracts that have problems of initial validity. See supra part VII.B.
178. Principles uses the term "non-performance" rather than "breach." Appar-
ently this is because it encompasses breaches that are excused by force majeure.
American doctrine is not clear on the question of whether such a non-performance is
a breach that is excused or no breach at all.
179. Principles, supra note 7, art. 7.3.1(2)(b) & cmt. 3(b).
180. Id. art. 7.3.1(2)(a).
181. It is not among the criteria to determine the materiality of a breach under
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241 (1979), nor under its predecessor Restate-
ment of Contracts § 275 (1932).
182. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
183. Principles, supra note 7, art. 7.3.4. If the prospective inability or unwillingness
to perform is less than clear, the party who is insecure may demand adequate assur-
ance of performance. As under U.C.C. § 2-609 (12th ed. 1990), adequate assurance
under all the circumstances may consist of words of assurance at one extreme and at
another a letter of credit or guarantee of a creditworthy surety. Id. art. 7.3.4 cmt. 2. If
adequate assurance is not given, the insecure party may terminate the contract.
184. Id. art. 7.3.2.
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policy of keeping the contract alive if at all feasible is evident in the
difficult test for termination.
Termination opens the door to all remedies except, of course, spe-
cific performance because, upon termination, all executory duties (ex-
cept those dealing with dispute settlement or otherwise understood to
survive the contract) are terminated."85 Interestingly, restitution as a
remedy is treated in the sub-chapter18 6 on termination, whereas the
remedy of damages is treated in a separate sub-chapter. Presumably
this is because damages is a remedy for breaches of contracts that are
not terminated as well as those that are terminated. If restitution in
kind is sought, the party seeking restitution (who may be the breach-
ing or the aggrieved party) must make concurrent restitution of any-
thing received under the contract. 87 For example, upon termination,
the party who has purchased a phony Renoir painting can get a re-
fund, but must return the painting.'88
C. Damages
May the party who terminates and obtains restitution also get dam-
ages for breach? Every non-performance, unless excused as discussed
above, constitutes a breach and creates a right of action for dam-
ages.'89 This is a departure from the long civil law tradition that re-
garded fault as a necessary element of a breach. 9 ' This right to be
compensated in damages is not inconsistent with any other remedy
that may be available. 9'
Except as regards penalty clauses, the general principles governing
the measurement of damages are quite similar in the common law and
civil law systems. Joseph Pothier's Traitd des obligations was the basis
of the damages principles of the modern civil law and of the common
law of England and the United States. For breach of contract, medie-
val lawyers on the continent of Europe had developed a rule of recov-
ery of damnum emergens and lucrum cessans, which Pothier
185. Id. art. 7.3.5.
186. What here is called a subchapter is called a "section" in Principles. See id. art.
7.36.
187. Id. art. 7.3.6. Appropriate tules are in place where the goods or other per-
formance cannot be returned. Where the rights of third parties intervene, Principles
leaves the matter to domestic law. Id. cmt. 5.
188. Id. illus. 2.
189. Id. art. 7.4.1.
190. A fundamental distinction between the common law and civil law con-
cepts of breach of contract, and consequent entitlement to damages, is the
requirement of fault of the party committing a breach in the civil law, and its
absence in the common law. The fault distinction is a result of different con-
ceptions of the contractual relationship, since English common law was de-
veloped by merchants, and continental civil law was developed by priests.
Ugo Draetta et al., Breach and Adaptation of International Contracts: An Introduc-
tion to Lex Mercatoria 33 (1992).
191. Principles, supra note 7, art. 7.4.1.
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refined.19 2 This formula was adopted in the Restatement of Contracts
as "losses caused and gains prevented." 193 It appears in Principles as
"any loss which it suffered and any gain of which it was deprived." 194
Damages must be "established with a reasonable degree of cer-
tainty."' 95 If damages are uncertain, the court may place a value on
an opportunity that has been lost. This alternative sort of recovery is
well-known in England, but has not been argued much in the United
States. 196 If the aggrieved party can satisfy neither of these rules, the
court has discretion to assess damages.1 97 This goes beyond the prac-
tice of courts in the United States, but discretionary justice might well
describe cases where the court awards the plaintiff reliance damages
because the expectancy interest cannot be proved 98 and cases where
the loss of profits cannot be proved but the court awards the rental
value of property that might have produced profits. 199
More particularized rules are familiar. If the aggrieved party enters
into a substitute contract, that is, covers or resells, the difference in
price between the breached contract and the substitute contract pro-
vides the basis for determining general damages. If no substitute
transaction is made, damages are measured by the difference between
the contract price and the "current price." 2" Consequential damages
are available if the foreseeability rule of Hadley v. Baxendale,201 vin-
tage Pothier, is met.2°2
192. See Reinhard Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of
the Civilian Tradition 817-33 (1990).
193. Restatement of Contracts § 329 (1932). Fuller and Perdue explain the differ-
ence between their tripartite division of damages and this bipartite division. Lon
Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46 Yale
L.J. 52, 55-57 (1936).
194. Principles, supra note 7, art. 7.4.2(1).
195. Id. art. 7.4.3(1).
196. See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 64, § 14-10, at 605-06 (urging development
of this line of recovery).
197. Principles, supra note 7, art. 7.4.3(3).
198. Calamari & Perillo, supra note 64, § 14-9, at 603-04.
199. Id § 14-11, at 606.
200. Principles, supra note 7, art. 7.4.6. American formulations normally use the
term "market price." The UNIDROIT formulation recognizes that not all countries
have markets. Even in countries having a market economy, not all property and serv-
ices flow through the market.
201. 9 Ex. 341 (1854). The case states that the second rule of damages restricts
recovery to those "as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation
of the parties at the time they made the contract, as a probable result of the breach of
it." Id. at 354. Pothier wrote that if there is no fraud, the obligor "is only liable for the
damages and interest which might have been contemplated at the time of the contract;
for to such alone the debtor can be considered as having intended to submit." I Rob-
ert Joseph Pothier, A Treatise on the Law of Obligations, or Contracts 1 160, at 81
(William David Evans trans., 1826).
202. Principles, supra note 7, art. 7.4.4.
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D. Mitigation and Comparative Culpability
Principles adopts familiar rules on mitigation °3 but an unfamiliar
rule on contributory harm. A party may not recover to the extent its
conduct, or conduct of those for whom it has assumed the risk, con-
tributed to the harm.2 °4 Two illustrations are given. The common law
would regard one of them as an action for contribution between con-
current tortfeasors whose negligence resulted in injury to a ship's pas-
senger.2 0 5 Let us put aside for the moment the coverage of personal
injuries in this document.2 0 6 The other illustration involves an exclu-
sive franchise where the franchisor wrongfully demands payment from
the franchisee before it is due. Because of this demand, the franchisee
purchases some of its stock-in-trade from another seller in violation of
its promise of exclusive dealing. The franchisor demands damages (a
penalty) for the franchisee's breach. It is held that only a part of the
damages will be granted because the franchisor contributed to the
breach. The result is intriguing. The common law would likely ask
whether the franchisor's breach was (1) a repudiation or material
breach or (2) an immaterial breach. If it was the former, the
franchisor is entitled to no damages; if the latter, it is entitled to full
damages diminished by the franchisee's counterclaim. Comparative
culpability is a fairly recent development in American tort law and
only a suggestion in contract law.20 7 There is, however, a provision in
the Restatement (Second) that opens the door to such a development.
Section 351(3) provides: "A court may limit damages for foreseeable
loss by excluding recovery for loss of profits, by allowing recovery
only for loss incurred in reliance, or otherwise if it concludes that in
the circumstances justice so requires in order to avoid disproportion-
ate compensation.",2 °Professor Young has suggested that this provi-
sion might be applied to a set of facts much like that envisioned by the
illustration above, 0 9 but he concludes that the Restatement provision
is overbroad.21 °
203. Id. art. 7.4.8.
204. Id. art. 7.4.7.
205. Id. art. 7.4.7 illus. 2.
206. See infra text accompanying notes 209-13.
207. See Lippes v. Atlantic Bank, 419 N.Y.S.2d 505, 513 (App. Div. 1979) (applying
a comparative culpability statute to a commercial transaction in which the court char-
acterizes the breach as negligent). In State v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 612 P.2d 809, 811
(Wash. Ct. App. 1980), the trial court applied comparative negligence to a contract
claim, but was reversed on appeal; see also Umpqua River Navig. Co. v. Crescent City
Harbor Dist., 618 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding no negligent acts by plaintiff, thus
rejecting defendant's comparative negligence claim).
208. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 351(3) (1979).
209. William F. Young, Half Measures, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 19, 25-28 (1981) (discuss-
ing Carfield & Sons v. Cowling, 616 P.2d 1008 (Colo. Ct. App. 1980)).




Principles contains two articles on interest accruing because of non-
performance. The first of these, Article 7.4.9, provides that interest
accrues on overdue debts. Such interest represents general damages
for the injury done to the creditor. Even if late payment is justified by
force majeure, interest is imposed to prevent the unearned enrichment
of the debtor at the expense of the creditor.2" Subject to exceptions,
the rate of interest imposed is "the average bank short-term lending
rate to prime borrowers prevailing for the currency of payment at the
place for payment." ' In the United States, state law frequently sets
a statutory rate of interest. Where no such statute exists, this formula
accurately describes the creditor's general damages in many cases, but
undercompensates for the creditor's damages where the debtor is not
a prime credit risk.
The common law imposes interest as general damages for non-pay-
ment. It refuses, however, to award consequential damages for such a
breach. The reason for this is that while consequential damages were
available under the writ of assumpsit, they were not granted in actions
where the writ was debt.21 3 Freed from the power of the graveyard of
writs, Principles permits recovery of such damages.-' This gives ef-
fect to the principle of full compensation announced in Article 7.4.2.
Interest on the breaches of an obligation other than the non-pay-
ment of money is a controversial issue in American law. Many con-
fusing decisions have been made and rules announced that are
difficult to apply. Absent a statutory rule to the contrary, it is gener-
ally held that interest is not allowed on unliquidated damages but is
allowed on ascertainable damages whether liquidated or not.2 15 Such
a distinction is an invitation for the prolongation of litigation. It is
difficult to apply in concrete cases and therefore invites appeals from
the trial court. In addition, if the damages are clearly unliquidated,
the obligor has a decided incentive to be dilatory. Principles article
7.4.10 addresses this problem and provides for the accrual of interest
from the time of the non-performance, taking note of the reality that
211. Principles, supra note 7, art. 7.4.9 cmt. 1.
212. Id. art. 7.4.9(2).
213. Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts: A Comprehensive Treatise on the
Working Rules of Contract Law § 995, at 13-14 (1964). See also Parkway Windows.
Inc. v. River Tower Assocs., 485 N.Y.S.2d 755, 759 (App. Div. 1985) (citing O'Rourke
Eng'g Constr. Co. v. City of New York, 241 N.Y.S. 613 (App. Div. 1930), and provid-
ing a thorough discussion of the case law denying consequential damages for failure to
pay money in timely fashion).
Another line of cases shows the reluctance of the common law to allow damages in
excess of interest for late payments involving contract clauses that provide liquidated
damages for late payments or for failure to pay (over and above the interest and
statutorily allowed "late charges"). These are struck down as illegal penalties. A
leading case is Caesar v. Rubinson, 67 N.E. 58 (N.Y. 1903).
214. Principles, supra note 7, art. 7.4.9(3) & cmt. 1.
215. See Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 3.6 (2d ed. 1993).
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"[t]his solution is that best suited to international trade where it is not
the practice for business persons to leave their money idle. '2 16 Once
again, the principle of full compensation is effectuated.
F. Tort and Tort-like Damages
Principles does not delineate a distinction between tort and con-
tract. Yet, some illustrations show an implicit acceptance into the
world of contract cases that we normally associate with the realm of
tort. One illustration concerns the relative liability of a party who
carelessly inspects an elevator and another who fails to provide suffi-
cient light where the elevator stopped.217 Another illustration in-
volves a crane that crumples and crushes an architect's car.218 These
are but two of a number of illustrations that demonstrate that the
drafters of Principles embraced a broader conception of contract, and
therefore a narrower conception of tort, than that to which we are
accustomed.
Even where the breach is clearly a breach of contract, the drafters
were willing to embrace a broader conception of the scope of contract
damages where the injury involves pain and suffering, mental distress,
or harm to the aggrieved party's reputation. Thus, in one illustration a
young architect (A) receives a prestigious commission, and, without
cause, is replaced by a more experienced architect. A may recover
"not only for the material loss suffered but also for the harm to A's
reputation and the loss of the chance of becoming better known,
which the commission would have provided." '219 Such recoveries,
while not unheard of,220 are rare in the United States. Also rare are
contract cases in which damages for mental distress are awarded.221
XIII. THE JUDGMENT
Generally, Principles states that a judgment for damages should be
in a lump sum. In appropriate cases (e.g., where compensation is pay-
able over a long period of time based on a percentage of the value of
production), judgments should be payable in installments. 22 Where
216. Principles, supra note 7, art. 7.4.10 cmt.
217. Principles, supra note 7, art. 7.4.7 illus. 2.
218. Id. art. 7.4.2. illus. 3; see also id. illus. 1.
219. Id. art. 7.4.2. illus. 6.
220. Calamari & Perillo, supra note 64, § 14-18, at 617-18.
221. See id. § 14-5(b), at 596. Typical is Carpel v. Saget Studios, Inc., 326 F. Supp.
1331, 1334 (E.D. Pa. 1971). The defendant undertook to photograph the plaintiffs'
wedding. He failed to deliver any photographs; apparently the films were ruined or
destroyed. It was held that there could be no recovery for sentimental value or
mental distress. See also Sagnia-Blythe v. Gamblin, 611 N.Y.S.2d 1002, 1004 (N.Y.
Civ. Ct. 1994) (holding failure to deliver bridesmaids' dresses before the scheduled
time for the wedding insufficient to warrant intentional infliction of emotional distress
damages).
222. Principles, supra note 7, art. 7.4.11(1) & illus. 2.
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such an installment judgment is appropriate, the judgment may be in-
dexed.3 We may take note of, and applaud, the drafters for their
realism.
In international trade, the question of the appropriate currency con-
stantly arises. The currency in which payment should be made is dis-
cussed above.224 A separate question is, in what currency should
damages be assessed? Fluctuating exchange rates explain why this
question can be of the highest importance. The ratio between the cur-
rency in which the monetary obligation was expressed and that in
which the harm was suffered may have changed in an important way
between the time of the breach and the time of the assessment of
damages. Principles states merely that the "more appropriate"'  cur-
rency is to be used for the assessment. The official commentary, how-
ever, states that "[t]he choice is left to the aggrieved party, provided
that the principle of full compensation is respected." 6
XIV. PENALTY CLAUSES
Nowhere in the law of contracts has the clash of common law and
civil law notions seemed as irreconcilable as in the treatment of pen-
alty clauses. They have been void in the common law world for two
centuries, three, if we count back to the time the enforcement of penal
bonds were enjoined. 2 7 Whatever merit this rule continues to have in
consumer transactions, it is a rule that deserves overturning in com-
mercial transactions between businesses.' Although some economic
analysts have supported the rule on the ground that the enforcement
of penalty clauses would deter efficient breaches, the contrary has
been cogently demonstrated.229 It represents paternalistic interfer-
ence with contractual freedom. The civil law perhaps went too far in
the other direction. Under the Code Napoleon, penalty clauses were
binding and could not be modified by the court except in cases of part
performance of the principal obligation of the contract.23 In 1975,
however, Article 1152 of the French Civil Code was amended to pro-
vide: "Nevertheless, the Judge may reduce or increase the agreed-
upon penalty if it is manifestly excessive or ridiculously small. Any
223. Id. art. 7.4.11(2).
224. See supra text accompanying note 154.
225. Principles, supra note 7, art. 7.4.12.
226. Id. cmt.
227. For a brief history, see Charles T. McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Dam-
ages § 21 (1935).
228. For a good cogent summary of reasons why the rule against penalties should
be overturned, see David Brizzee, Liquidated Damages and the Penalty Rule: A Reas-
sessment, 1991 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1613 (1991).
229. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the
Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of
Efficient Breach, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 554, 578 (1977).
230. Code Civil [C. Civ.] arts. 1226, 1152 & 1231 (Fr.). See James B. Thayer, Penal
Clauses in Contracts, 9 Tul. L.Rev. 191 (1935).
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contrary stipulation will be considered not written."'231 This revision
removes any possible rational opposition to the validity of penalty
clauses. Principles adopts a rule consistent with the modern civil law.
So should we.232 Under Principles, penalty clauses are valid, but
agreed penalty sums may be reduced if they are "grossly excessive. 233
XV. PARTY AUTONOMY AND DEFAULT RULES
Principles forcefully supports freedom of contract and the party au-
tonomy such freedom implies. Its opening article proclaims: "The
parties are free to enter into a contract and to determine its con-
tent. '234 As a corollary, the parties may derogate from Principles ex-
cept to the limited extent delineated earlier in this essay.2 35
Consequently, except to this limited extent, Principles sets out default
rules to be applied where the parties have not displaced them by
agreement. Much recent legal scholarship in the United States has
focused on what rationale should guide the legislator, judge, or
scholar in the choice of default rules. There are those who preach the
sometimes discordant gospels of economic efficiency, the implementa-
tion of communitarian values, the inference of norms implicit in the
parties' relationship, or implicitly consented to, and the rationale that
the parties "are obligated in fairness to do their part to maintain the
cooperative venture. 2 36
It cannot be said that Principles espouses any one of these gospels
to the exclusion of the others. As is the case with CISG, normative
force is put behind an approach whereby every attempt is made to
keep either party from walking away from a deal because the other
party has erred in some way. Is this because of fairness, or because of
efficiency? It has very little to do with communitarian values or con-
231. This translation is from Schlesinger, supra note 4, at 672-73. The rule as it
applies to excessively high penalties is substantially in accord with German Civil Code
Section 343, and Swiss Code of Obligations Article 163, but contrary to German Com-
mercial Code Section 348. Id. at 676-77.
232. International traders routinely circumvent the common law rule against penal-
ties by use of standby letters of credit. This effective end-run around the rule creates
expensive transaction costs. See Gerald T. McLaughlin, Standby Letters of Credit and
Penalty Clauses: An Unexpected Synergy, 43 Ohio St. L.J. 1, 19 (1982).
233. Principles, supra note 7, art. 7.4.13. Typically the common law has treated a
clause providing for agreed damages as either a provision for valid liquidated dam-
ages or as a void penalty. In Jordache Enter., Inc. v. Global Union Bank, 668 F. Supp.
939, 944 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), Judge Leval took the bold and intelligent step of reducing
an agreed damages clause to 35% of the agreed amount.
234. Id. art. 1.1.
235. Id. art. 1.5.
236. The literature can be found in the notes to Steven J. Burton, Default Princi-
ples, Legitimacy, and the Authority of a Contract, 3 So. Cal. Interdisciplinary L.J. 115,
116-18 (1993). The quoted language expresses Professor Burton's rationale for de-
fault rules. It is a view long espoused by Professor Hillman. See Robert A. Hillman,
Keeping the Deal Together After Material Breach-Common Law Mitigation Rules,
the U.C.C., and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 47 U. Colo. L. Rev. 553 (1976).
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sent. Certainly, much commentary on the related articles of CISG
talks in terms of efficiency; for example, the avoidance of waste that
would occur where goods are dispatched to a distant country and re-
jected out of hand because of some defect. 37 Thus, the emphasis is on
cure and the erection of difficult barriers to inhibit the termination of
the contract. The fairness principle produces the same result, as ex-
pressed by Professor Burton:
A contract sets up a cooperative scheme from which both parties
expect to benefit. The parties are obligated in fairness to do their
parts to maintain the scheme. This is a special obligation between
contract parties, akin to but distinct from the obligations arising
from the parties' consent.238
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that all of the
UNIDROIT default rules are based on efficiency or fairness. Many of
the rules of offer and acceptance are based on a political compromise
between those who are familiar with two separate bodies of law on the
revocability vel non of offers. Neither of these bodies of law is more
efficient or fair than the other; neither is the compromise more fair or
efficient. As Corbin said in the context of the mailbox rule, "One of
the parties must carry the risk [of lost or delayed communication]. We
need a definite and uniform rule as to this. We can choose either rule,
but we must choose one. We can put the risk on either party, but we
must not leave it in doubt." 239
There is no one rationale for the default rules in Principles. Rejec-
tion of the French rule that only a court can terminate a contract, and
adoption of the common law idea that a seriously aggrieved party may
terminate the contract as a form of self-help, appears to be squarely
based on efficiency. On the other hand, the notion that a party may
withhold performance if the other parties' earlier scheduled perform-
ance has not taken place has roots in commercial understanding of the
contractual relation and the fairness principle. The drafters of Princi-
ples are not philosophers. They are lawyers who are aware of the
practices of the market and who have a respect for party autonomy
and a vision of what is efficient, fair and healthy in a commercial rela-
tionship. Each of the rules they have promulgated appears to have
been examined from each of these perspectives.
In the event the contract contains a gap, and Principles provides no
default rule, the tribunal is urged to fill the gap with "a term which is
237. The following commentary on CISG is typical. "The purpose of restricting the
buyer's choice of avoidance serves primarily the interests of the seller. Once the con-
tract is avoided, he must take back the goods supplied... [See Article 811 which
necessarily involves risks of damage or loss and expenses such as costs for transports
and storage." Michael Will, in Bianca & Bonell, supra note 14, at 363.
238. Burton, supra note 226, at 166.
239. 1 Corbin, supra note 12, § 3.24, at 440-41.
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appropriate in the circumstances."' 40 in determining what the appro-
priate term should be, the following factors are to be taken into con-
sideration: "(a) the intention of the parties; (b) the nature and
purpose of the contract; (c) good faith and fair dealing; and (d) rea-
sonableness." '241 These criteria do not fulfill any one of the philosoph-
ical schools of thought on gap-filling. They are the kinds of concepts,
however, that lawyers and judges can work with.
CONCLUSION
Ten thousand years ago the inhabitants of Jericho were making
tools of obsidian, a volcanic glass, that was procured from an identi-
fied source in Anatolia, a distance of some 1,000 miles.242 Similarly,
obsidian from the Tetons has been found in pre-Columbian mounds in
the Ohio Valley. From ancient beginnings such as these, cross-border
trade has gradually expanded in scope. Since the voyages of Colum-
bus and Vasco da Gama, this expansion has reached the point where
some countries have become nearly totally dependent upon interna-
tional trade, and, in other countries, major segments of the economy
are tied to it.243 Commercial actors are on a fast track to the creation
of a global market. If markets are to function they must be policed
and regulated. Actors in the market must have reason to trust the
integrity of the market and the transactions that are made in the mar-
ketplace, often a global marketplace that is no longer an agora. The
emerging global market is not a place, it is a network of communica-
tions in which telexes, faxes, E-mail and the telephone replace the city
piazza.
As the market changes from the gathering of merchants in a limited
geographical spot to a global interchange of communications, the myr-
iad local laws of the marketplace are no longer adequate to assure the
commercial community that even-handed rules will govern their trans-
actions. Principles is one step toward such assurance. Those of us
whose professional formation is rooted in the common law may ex-
amine Principles and note that some of the individual principles are
foreign to our way of thinking; lawyers trained in the civil law will find
even more that Principles is foreign to their habits of thought. Neither
group should dismiss the content of this innovative document for
these reasons. Each Principles provision should be looked at on the
merits, with the understanding it was approved after debate and study
by an outstanding group of legal professionals.
240. Principles, supra note 7, art. 4.8(1).
241. Id. art. 4.8.
242. See Perillo, supra note 1, at 31.
243. One aspect of this expansion of trade is examined in Joseph C. Sweeney, From
Columbus to Cooperation-Trade and Shipping Policies from 1492 to 1992, 13 Ford-
ham Int'l L.J. 481 (1989-90).
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On a pragmatic note, Principles will have a limited impact unless its
implementation is made available to merchants and their attorneys.
The implementation of CISG by court decisions and scholarly discus-
sion of its provisions is reported in an ingenious piece of software
known as UNILEX. 24 Unless a comparable aid to research is pro-
vided with respect to Principles, uniformity of application is unlikely
to occur, diffusion of knowledge of its implementation will be erratic,
and its effect limited.
244. Italian National Research Council and the Centre for Comparative and For-
eign Law Studies, UNILEX: A Comprehensive and "Intelligent" Data Base on the
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods on Disc




UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS(*)
PREAMBLE
(Purpose of the Principles)
These Principles set forth general rules for international commercial
contracts.
They shall be applied when the parties have agreed that their con-
tract be governed by them.
They may be applied when the parties have agreed that their con-
tract be governed by "general principles of law," the "lex mercatoria"
or the like.
They may provide a solution to an issue raised when it proves im-
possible to establish the relevant rule of the applicable law.
They may be used to interpret or supplement international uniform
law instruments.










Nothing in these Principles requires a contract to be concluded in or
evidenced by writing. It may be proved by any means, including
witnesses.
Article 1.3
(Binding character of contract)
A contract validly entered into is binding upon the parties. It can
only be modified or terminated in accordance with its terms or by
agreement or as otherwise provided in these Principles.






Nothing in these Principles shall restrict the application of
mandatory rules, whether of national, international or supranational
origin, which are applicable in accordance with the relevant rules of
private international law.
Article 1.5
(Exclusion or modification by the parties)
The parties may exclude the application of these Principles or dero-
gate from or vary the effect of any of their provisions, except as other-
wise provided in the Principles.
Article 1.6
(Interpretation and supplementation of the Principles)
(1) In the interpretation of these Principles, regard is to be had to
their international character and to their purposes including the need
to promote uniformity in their application.
(2) Issues within the scope of these Principles but not expressly
settled by them are as far as possible to be settled in accordance with
their underlying general principles.
Article 1.7
(Good faith and fair dealing)
(1) Each party must act in accordance with good faith and fair
dealing in international trade.
(2) The parties may not exclude or limit this duty.
Article 1.8
(Usages and practices)
(1) The parties are bound by any usage to which they have agreed
and by any practices which they have established between themselves.
(2) The parties are bound by a usage that is widely known to and
regularly observed in international trade by parties in the particular




(1) Where notice is required it may be given by any means appro-
priate to the circumstances.




(3) For the purpose of paragraph (2) a notice "reaches" a person
when given to that person orally or delivered at that person's place of
business or mailing address.
(4) For the purpose of this article "notice" includes a declaration,




- "court" includes an arbitral tribunal;
- where a party has more than one place of business the relevant
"place of business" is that which has the closest relationship to the
contract and its performance, having regard to the circumstances
known to or contemplated by the parties at any time before or at the
conclusion of the contract;
- "obligor" refers to the party who is to perform an obligation and
"obligee" refers to the party who is entitled to performance of that
obligation;
- "writing" means any mode of communication that preserves a
record of the information contained therein and is capable of being





A contract may be concluded either by the acceptance of an offer or
by conduct of the parties that is sufficient to show agreement.
Article 2.2
(Definition of offer)
A proposal for concluding a contract constitutes an offer if it is suf-
ficiently definite and indicates the intention of the offeror to be bound
in case of acceptance.
Article 2.3
(Withdrawal of offer)
(1) An offer becomes effective when it reaches the offeree.
(2) An offer, even if it is irrevocable, may be withdrawn if the





(1) Until a contract is concluded an offer may be revoked if the
revocation reaches the offeree before it has dispatched an acceptance.
(2) However, an offer cannot be revoked
(a) if it indicates, whether by stating a fixed time for acceptance or
otherwise, that it is irrevocable; or
(b) if it was reasonable for the offeree to rely on the offer as being
irrevocable and the offeree has acted in reliance on the offer.
Article 2.5
(Rejection of offer)
An offer is terminated when a rejection reaches the offeror.
Article 2.6
(Mode of acceptance)
(1) A statement made by or other conduct of the offeree indicat-
ing assent to an offer is an acceptance. Silence or inactivity does not
in itself amount to acceptance.
(2) An acceptance of an offer becomes effective when the indica-
tion of assent reaches the offeror.
(3) However, if, by virtue of the offer or as a result of practices
which the parties have established between themselves or of usage,
the offeree may indicate assent by performing an act without notice to
the offeror, the acceptance is effective when the act is performed.
Article 2.7
(Time of acceptance)
An offer must be accepted within the time the offeror has fixed or,
if no time is fixed, within a reasonable time having regard to the cir-
cumstances, including the rapidity of the means of communication
employed by the offeror. An oral offer must be accepted immediately
unless the circumstances indicate otherwise.
Article 2.8
(Acceptance within a fixed period of time)
(1) A period of time for acceptance fixed by the offeror in a tele-
gram or a letter begins to run from the moment the telegram is
handed in for dispatch or from the date shown on the letter or, if no
such date is shown, from the date shown on the envelope. A period of
time for acceptance fixed by the offeror by means of instantaneous




(2) Official holidays or non-business days occurring during the pe-
riod for acceptance are included in calculating the period. However, if
a notice of acceptance cannot be delivered at the address of the of-
feror on the last day of the period because that day falls on an official
holiday or a non-business day at the place of business of the offeror,
the period is extended until the first business day which follows.
Article 2.9
(Late acceptance. Delay in transmission)
(1) A late acceptance is nevertheless effective as an acceptance if
without undue delay the offeror so informs the offeree or gives notice
to that effect.
(2) If a letter or other writing containing a late acceptance shows
that it has been sent in such circumstances that if its transmission had
been normal it would have reached the offeror in due time, the late
acceptance is effective as an acceptance unless, without undue delay,




An acceptance may be withdrawn if the withdrawal reaches the of-




(1) A reply to an offer which purports to be an acceptance but
contains additions, limitations or other modifications is a rejection of
the offer and constitutes a counter-offer.
(2) However, a reply to an offer which purports to be an accept-
ance but contains additional or different terms which do not materi-
ally alter the terms of the offer constitutes an acceptance, unless the
offeror, without undue delay, objects to the discrepancy. If the offeror
does not object, the terms of the contract are the terms of the offer
with the modifications contained in the acceptance.
Article 2.12
(Writings in confirmation)
If a writing which is sent within a reasonable time after the conclu-
sion of the contract and which purports to be a confirmation of the
contract contains additional or different terms, such terms become
part of the contract, unless they materially alter the contract or the




(Conclusion of contract dependent on agreement on
specific matters or in a specific form)
Where in the course of negotiations one of the parties insists that
the contract is not concluded until there is agreement on specific mat-
ters or in a specific form, no contract is concluded before agreement is
reached on those matters or in that form.
Article 2.14
(Contract with terms deliberately left open)
(1) If the parties intend to conclude a contract, the fact that they
intentionally leave a term to be agreed upon in further negotiations or
to be determined by a third person does not prevent a contract from
coming into existence.
(2) The existence of the contract is not affected by the fact that
subsequently
(a) the parties reach no agreement on the term; or
(b) the third person does not determine the term,
provided that there is an alternative means of rendering the term defi-
nite that is reasonable in the circumstances, having regard to the in-
tention of the parties.
Article 2.15
(Negotiations in bad faith)
(1) A party is free to negotiate and is not liable for failure to reach
an agreement.
(2) However, a party who negotiates or breaks off negotiations in
bad faith is liable for the losses caused to the other party.
(3) It is bad faith, in particular, for a party to enter into or con-




Where information is given as confidential by one party in the
course of negotiations, the other party is under a duty not to disclose
that information or to use it improperly for its own purposes, whether
or not a contract is subsequently concluded. Where appropriate, the
remedy for breach of that duty may include compensation based on





A contract in writing which contains a clause indicating that the
writing completely embodies the terms on which the parties have
agreed cannot be contradicted or supplemented by evidence of prior
statements or agreements. However, such statements or agreements
may be used to interpret the writing.
Article 2.18
(Written modification clauses)
A contract in writing which contains a clause requiring any modifi-
cation or termination by agreement to be in writing may not be other-
wise modified or terminated. However, a party may be precluded by
its conduct from asserting such a clause to the extent that the other
party has acted in reliance on that conduct.
Article 2.19
(Contracting under standard terms)
(1) Where one party or both parties use standard terms in con-
cluding a contract, the general rules on formation apply, subject to
Articles 2.20 - 2.22.
(2) Standard terms are provisions which are prepared in advance
for general and repeated use by one party and which are actually used
without negotiation with the other party.
Article 2.20
(Surprising terms)
(1) No term contained in standard terms which is of such a charac-
ter that the other party could not reasonably have expected it, is effec-
tive unless it has been expressly accepted by that party.
(2) In determining whether a term is of such a character regard is
to be had to its content, language and presentation.
Article 2.21
(Conflict between standard terms and non-standard terms)
In case of conflict between a standard term and a term which is not
a standard term the latter prevails.
Article 2.22
(Battle of forms)
Where both parties use standard terms and reach agreement except
on those terms, a contract is concluded on the basis of the agreed
terms and of any standard terms which are common in substance un-
less one party clearly indicates in advance, or later and without undue
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These Principles do not deal with invalidity arising from
(a) lack of capacity;
(b) lack of authority;
(c) immorality or illegality.
Article 3.2
(Validity of mere agreement)
A contract is concluded, modified or terminated by the mere agree-
ment of the parties, without any further requirement.
Article 3.3
(Initial impossibility)
(1) The mere fact that at the time of the conclusion of the contract
the performance of the obligation assumed was impossible does not
affect the validity of the contract.
(2) The mere fact that at the time of the conclusion of the contract
a party was not entitled to dispose of the assets to which the contract
relates does not affect the validity of the contract.
Article 3.4
(Definition of mistake)
Mistake is an erroneous assumption relating to facts or to law ex-
isting when the contract was concluded.
Article 3.5
(Relevant mistake)
(1) A party may only avoid the contract for mistake if, when the
contract was concluded, the mistake was of such importance that a
reasonable person in the same situation as the party in error would
only have concluded the contract on materially different terms or
would not have concluded it at all if the true state of affairs had been
known, and
(a) the other party made the same mistake, or caused the mistake,
or knew or ought to have known of the mistake and it was contrary to
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing to leave the mistaken
party in error; or
19941
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(b) the other party had not at the time of avoidance acted in reli-
ance on the contract.
(2) However, a party may not avoid the contract if
(a) it was grossly negligent in committing the mistake; or
(b) the mistake relates to a matter in regard to which the risk of
mistake was assumed or, having regard to the circumstances, should
be borne by the mistaken party.
Article 3.6
(Error in expression or transmission)
An error occurring in the expression or transmission of a declara-




A party is not entitled to avoid the contract on the ground of mis-
take if the circumstances on which that party relies afford, or could
have afforded, a remedy for non-performance.
Article 3.8
(Fraud)
A party may avoid the contract when it has been led to conclude the
contract by the other party's fraudulent representation, including lan-
guage or practices, or fraudulent non-disclosure of circumstances
which, according to reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing,
the latter party should have disclosed.
Article 3.9
(Threat)
A party may avoid the contract when it has been led to conclude the
contract by the other party's unjustified threat which, having regard to
the circumstances, is so imminent and serious as to leave the first
party no reasonable alternative. In particular, a threat is unjustified if
the act or omission with which a party has been threatened is wrongful




(1) A party may avoid the contract or an individual term of it if, at
the time of the conclusion of the contract, the contract or term unjusti-
fiably gave the other party an excessive advantage. Regard is to be
had, among other factors, to
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(a) the fact that the other party has taken unfair advantage of the
first party's dependence, economic distress or urgent needs, or of its
improvidence, ignorance, inexperience or lack of bargaining skill, and
(b) the nature and purpose of the contract.
(2) Upon the request of the party entitled to avoidance, a court
may adapt the contract or term in order to make it accord with rea-
sonable commercial standards of fair dealing.
(3) A court may also adapt the contract or term upon the request
of the party receiving notice of avoidance, provided that that party
informs the other party of its request promptly after receiving such
notice and before the other party has acted in reliance on it. The pro-
visions of Article 3.13(2) apply accordingly.
Article 3.11
(Third persons)
(1) Where fraud, threat, gross disparity or a party's mistake is im-
putable to, or is known or ought to be known by, a third person for
whose acts the other party is responsible, the contract may be avoided
under the same conditions as if the behaviour or knowledge had been
that of the party itself.
(2) Where fraud, threat or gross disparity is imputable to a third
person for whose acts the other party is not responsible, the contract
may be avoided if that party knew or ought to have known of the
fraud, threat or disparity, or has not at the time of avoidance acted in
reliance on the contract.
Article 3.12
(Confirmation)
If the party entitled to avoid the contract expressly or impliedly
confirms the contract after the period of time for giving notice of
avoidance has begun to run, avoidance of the contract is excluded.
Article 3.13
(Loss of right to avoid)
(1) If a party is entitled to avoid the contract for mistake but the
other party declares itself willing to perform or performs the contract
as it was understood by the party entitled to avoidance, the contract is
considered to have been concluded as the latter party understood it.
The other party must make such a declaration or render such per-
formance promptly after having been informed of the manner in
which the party entitled to avoidance had understood the contract and
before that party has acted in reliance on a notice of avoidance.
(2) After such a declaration or performance the right to avoidance









(1) Notice of avoidance shall be given within a reasonable time,
having regard to the circumstances, after the avoiding party knew or
could not have been unaware of the relevant facts or became capable
of acting freely.
(2) Where an individual term of the contract may be avoided by a
party under Article 3.10, the period of time for giving notice of avoid-
ance begins to run when that term is asserted by the other party.
Article 3.16
(Partial avoidance)
Where a ground of avoidance affects only individual terms of the
contract, the effect of avoidance is limited to those terms unless, hav-
ing regard to the circumstances, it is unreasonable to uphold the re-
maining contract.
Article 3.17
(Retroactive effect of avoidance)
(1) Avoidance takes effect retroactively.
(2) On avoidance either party may claim restitution of whatever it
has supplied under the contract or the part of it avoided, provided that
it concurrently makes restitution of whatever it has received under the
contract or the part of it avoided or, if it cannot make restitution in
kind, it makes an allowance for what it has received.
Article 3.18
(Damages)
Irrespective of whether or not the contract has been avoided, the
party who knew or ought to have known of the ground for avoidance
is liable for damages so as to put the other party in the same position
in which it would have been if it had not concluded the contract.
Article 3.19
(Mandatory character of the provisions)
The provisions of this Chapter are mandatory, except insofar as






The provisions of this Chapter apply with appropriate adaptations





(Intention of the parties)
(1) A contract shall be interpreted according to the common in-
tention of the parties.
(2) If such an intention cannot be established, the contract shall be
interpreted according to the meaning that reasonable persons of the
same kind as the parties would give to it in the same circumstances.
Article 4.2
(Interpretation of statements and other conduct)
(1) The statements and other conduct of a party shall be inter-
preted according to that party's intention if the other party knew or
could not have been unaware of that intention.
(2) If the preceding paragraph is not applicable, such statements
and other conduct shall be interpreted according to the meaning that a
reasonable person of the same kind as the other party would give to it
in the same circumstances.
Article 4.3
(Relevant circumstances)
In applying Articles 4.1 and 4.2, regard shall be had to all the cir-
cumstances, including
(a) preliminary negotiations between the parties;
(b) practices which the parties have established between
themselves;
(c) the conduct of the parties subsequent to the conclusion of the
contract;
(d) the nature and purpose of the contract;






(Reference to contract or statement as a whole)
Terms and expressions shall be interpreted in the light of the whole
contract or statement in which they appear.
Article 4.5
(All terms to be given effect)
Contract terms shall be interpreted so as to give effect to all the
terms rather than to deprive some of them of effect.
Article 4.6
(Contra proferentem rule)
If contract terms supplied by one party are unclear, an interpreta-
tion against that party is preferred.
Article 4.7
(Linguistic discrepancies)
Where a contract is drawn up in two or more language versions
which are equally authoritative there is, in case of discrepancy be-
tween the versions, a preference for the interpretation according to a
version in which the contract was originally drawn up.
Article 4.8
(Supplying an omitted term)
(1) Where the parties to a contract have not agreed with respect
to a term which is important for a determination of their rights and
duties, a term which is appropriate in the circumstances shall be
supplied.
(2) In determining what is an appropriate term regard shall be
had, among other factors, to
(a) the intention of the parties;
(b) the nature and purpose of the contract;





(Express and implied obligations)






Implied obligations stem from
(a) the nature and purpose of the contract;
(b) practices established between the parties and usages;
(c) good faith and fair dealing;
(d) reasonableness.
Article 5.3
(Co-operation benveen the parties)
Each party shall cooperate with the other party when such co-oper-
ation may reasonably be expected for the performance of that party's
obligations.
Article 5.4
(Duty to achieve a specific result. Duty of best efforts)
(1) To the extent that an obligation of a party involves a duty to
achieve a specific result, that party is bound to achieve that result.
(2) To the extent that an obligation of a party involves a duty of
best efforts in the performance of an activity, that party is bound to
make such efforts as would be made by a reasonable person of the
same kind in the same circumstances.
Article 5.5
(Determination of kind of duty involved)
In determining the extent to which an obligation of a party involves
a duty of best efforts in the performance of an activity or a duty to
achieve a specific result, regard shall be had, among other factors, to
(a) the way in which the obligation is expressed in the contract;
(b) the contractual price and other terms of the contract;
(c) the degree of risk normally involved in achieving the expected
result;
(d) the ability of the other party to influence the performance of
the obligation.
Article 5.6
(Determination of quality of performance)
Where the quality of performance is neither fixed by, nor determi-
nable from, the contract a party is bound to render a performance of a






(1) Where a contract does not fix or make provision for determin-
ing the price, the parties are considered, in the absence of any indica-
tion to the contrary, to have made reference to the price generally
charged at the time of the conclusion of the contract for such perform-
ance in comparable circumstances in the trade concerned or, if no
such price is available, to a reasonable price.
(2) Where the price is to be determined by one party and that
determination is manifestly unreasonable, a reasonable price shall be
substituted notwithstanding any contract term to the contrary.
(3) Where the price is to be fixed by a third person, and that per-
son cannot or will not do so, the price shall be a reasonable price.
(4) Where the price is to be fixed by reference to factors which do
not exist or have ceased to exist or to be accessible, the nearest
equivalent factor shall be treated as a substitute.
Article 5.8
(Contract for an indefinite period)
A contract for an indefinite period may be ended by either party by
giving notice a reasonable time in advance.
CHAPTER 6
Performance
Section 1: Performance in General
Article 6.1.1
(Time of performance)
A party must perform its obligations:
(a) if a time is fixed by or determinable from the contract, at that
time;
(b) if a period of time is fixed by or determinable from the con-
tract, at any time within that period unless circumstances indicate that
the other party is to choose a time;
(c) in any other case, within a reasonable time after the conclusion
of the contract.
Article 6.1.2
(Performance at one time or in instalments)
In cases under Article 6.1.1(b) or (c), a party must perform its obli-
gations at one time if that performance can be rendered at one time





(1) The obligee may reject an offer to perform in part at the time
performance is due, whether or not such offer is coupled with an as-
surance as to the balance of the performance, unless the obligee has
no legitimate interest in so doing.
(2) Additional expenses caused to the obligee by partial perform-




(1) To the extent that the performances of the parties can be ren-
dered simultaneously, the parties are bound to render them simulta-
neously unless the circumstances indicate otherwise.
(2) To the extent that the performance of only one party requires
a period of time, that party is bound to render its performance first,
unless the circumstances indicate otherwise.
Article 6.1.5
(Earlier performance)
(1) The obligee may reject an earlier performance unless it has no
legitimate interest in so doing.
(2) Acceptance by a party of an earlier performance does not af-
fect the time for the performance of its own obligations if that time
has been fixed irrespective of the performance of the other party's
obligations.
(3) Additional expenses caused to the obligee by earlier perform-




(1) If the place of performance is neither fixed by, nor determina-
ble from, the contract, a party is to perform:
(a) a monetary obligation, at the obligee's place of business;
(b) any other obligation, at its own place of business.
(2) A party must bear any increase in the expenses incidental to
performance which is caused by a change in its place of business sub-




(Payment by cheque or other instrument)
(1) Payment may be made in any form used in the ordinary course
of business at the place for payment.
(2) However, an obligee who accepts, either by virtue of para-
graph (1) or voluntarily, a cheque, any other order to pay or a promise
to pay, is presumed to do so only on condition that it will be
honoured.
Article 6.1.8
(Payment by funds transfer)
(1) Unless the obligee has indicated a particular account, payment
may be made by a transfer to any of the financial institutions in which
the obligee has made it known that it has an account.
(2) In case of payment by a transfer the obligation of the obligor is




(1) If a monetary obligation is expressed in a currency other than
that of the place for payment, it may be paid by the obligor in the
currency of the place for payment unless
(a) that currency is not freely convertible; or
(b) the parties have agreed that payment should be made only in
the currency in which the monetary obligation is expressed.
(2) If it is impossible for the obligor to make payment in the cur-
rency in which the monetary obligation is expressed, the obligee may
require payment in the currency of the place for payment, even in the
case referred to in paragraph (1)(b).
(3) Payment in the currency of the place for payment is to be
made according to the applicable rate of exchange prevailing there
when payment is due.
(4) However, if the obligor has not paid at the time when payment
is due, the obligee may require payment according to the applicable




Where a monetary obligation is not expressed in a particular cur-
rency, payment must be made in the currency of the place where pay-





Each party shall bear the costs of performance of its obligations.
Article 6.1.12
(Imputation of payments)
(1) An obligor owing several monetary obligations to the same
obligee may specify at the time of payment the debt to which it in-
tends the payment to be applied. However, the payment discharges
first any expenses, then interest due and finally the principal.
(2) If the obligor makes no such specification, the obligee may,
within a reasonable time after payment, declare to the obligor the ob-
ligation to which it imputes the payment, provided that the obligation
is due and undisputed.
(3) In the absence of imputation under paragraphs (1) or (2), pay-
ment is imputed to that obligation which satisfies one of the following
criteria and in the order indicated:
(a) an obligation which is due or which is the first to fall due;
(b) the obligation for which the obligee has least security;
(c) the obligation which is the most burdensome for the obligor;
(d) the obligation which has arisen first.
If none of the preceding criteria applies, payment is imputed to all the
obligations proportionally.
Article 6.1.13
(Imputation of non-monetary obligations)
Article 6.1.12 applies with appropriate adaptations to the imputa-
tion of performance of non-monetary obligations.
Article 6.1.14
(Application for public permission)
Where the law of a State requires a public permission affecting the
validity of the contract or its performance and neither that law nor the
circumstances indicate otherwise
(a) if only one party has its place of business in that State, that
party shall take the measures necessary to obtain the permission;
(b) in any other case the party whose performance requires per-
mission shall take the necessary measures.
Article 6.1.15
(Procedure in applying for permission)
(1) The party required to take the measures necessary to obtain




(2) That party shall whenever appropriate give the other party no-
tice of the grant or refusal of such permission without undue delay.
Article 6.1.16
(Permission neither granted nor refused)
(1) If, notwithstanding the fact that the party responsible has
taken all measures required, permission is neither granted nor refused
within an agreed period or, where no period has been agreed, within a
reasonable time from the conclusion of the contract, either party is
entitled to terminate the contract.
(2) Where the permission affects some terms only, paragraph (1)
does not apply if, having regard to the circumstances, it is reasonable
to uphold the remaining contract even if the permission is refused.
Article 6.1.17
(Permission refused)
(1) The refusal of a permission affecting the validity of the con-
tract renders the contract void. If the refusal affects the validity of
some terms only, only such terms are void if, having regard to the
circumstances, it is reasonable to uphold the remaining contract.
(2) Where the refusal of a permission renders the performance of




(Contract to be observed)
Where the performance of a contract becomes more onerous for
one of the parties, that party is nevertheless bound to perform its obli-
gations subject to the following provisions on hardship.
Article 6.2.2
(Definition of hardship)
There is hardship where the occurrence of events fundamentally al-
ters the equilibrium of the contract either because the cost of a party's
performance has increased or because the value of the performance a
party receives has diminished, and
(a) the events occur or become known to the disadvantaged party
after the conclusion of the contract;
(b) the events could not reasonably have been taken into account
by the disadvantaged party at the time of the conclusion of the
contract;








(1) In case of hardship the disadvantaged party is entitled to re-
quest renegotiations. The request shall be made without undue delay
and shall indicate the grounds on which it is based.
(2) The request for renegotiation does not in itself entitle the dis-
advantaged party to withhold performance.
(3) Upon failure to reach agreement within a reasonable time
either party may resort to the court.
(4) If the court finds hardship it may, if reasonable,
(a) terminate the contract at a date and on terms to be fixed; or
(b) adapt the contract with a view to restoring its equilibrium.
CHAPTER 7
Non-Performance
Section 1: Non-Performance in General
Article 7.1.1
(Non-performance defined)
Non-performance is failure by a party to perform any of its obliga-
tions under the contract, including defective performance or late
performance.
Article 7.1.2
(Interference by the other party)
A party may not rely on the non-performance of the other party to
the extent that such non-performance was caused by the first party's




(1) Where the parties are to perform simultaneously, either party
may withhold performance until the other party tenders its
performance.
(2) Where the parties are to perform consecutively, the party that





(Cure by non-performing party)
(1) The non-performing party may, at its own expense, cure any
non-performance, provided that
(a) without undue delay, it gives notice indicating the proposed
manner and timing of the cure;
(b) cure is appropriate in the circumstances;
(c) the aggrieved party has no legitimate interest in refusing cure;
and
(d) cure is effected promptly.
(2) The right to cure is not precluded by notice of termination.
(3) Upon effective notice of cure, rights of the aggrieved party
that are inconsistent with the non-performing party's performance are
suspended until the time for cure has expired.
(4) The aggrieved party may withhold performance pending cure.
(5) Notwithstanding cure, the aggrieved party retains the right to
claim damages for delay as well as for any harm caused or not pre-
vented by the cure.
Article 7.1.5
(Additional period for performance)
(1) In a case of non-performance the aggrieved party may by no-
tice to the other party allow an additional period of time for
performance.
(2) During the additional period the aggrieved party may with-
hold performance of its own reciprocal obligations and may claim
damages but may not resort to any other remedy. If it receives notice
from the other party that the latter will not perform within that pe-
riod, or if upon expiry of that period due performance has not been
made, the aggrieved party may resort to any of the remedies that may
be available under this Chapter.
(3) Where in a case of delay in performance which is not funda-
mental the aggrieved party has given notice allowing an additional pe-
riod of time of reasonable length, it may terminate the contract at the
end of that period. If the additional period allowed is not of reason-
able length it shall be extended to a reasonable length. The aggrieved
party may in its notice provide that if the other party fails to perform
within the period allowed by the notice the contract shall automati-
cally terminate.
(4) Paragraph (3) does not apply where the obligation which has
not been performed is only a minor part of the contractual obligation





A clause which limits or excludes one party's liability for non-per-
formance or which permits one party to render performance substan-
tially different from what the other party reasonably expected may not
be invoked if it would be grossly unfair to do so, having regard to the
purpose of the contract.
Article 7.1.7
(Force majeure)
(1) Non-performance by a party is excused if that party proves
that the non-performance was due to an impediment beyond its con-
trol and that it could not reasonably be expected to have taken the
impediment into account at the time of the conclusion of the contract
or to have avoided or overcome it or its consequences.
(2) When the impediment is only temporary, the excuse shall have
effect for such period as is reasonable having regard to the effect of
the impediment on the performance of the contract.
(3) The party who fails to perform must give notice to the other
party of the impediment and its effect on its ability to perform. If the
notice is not received by the other party within a reasonable time after
the party who fails to perform knew or ought to have known of the
impediment, it is liable for damages resulting from such non-receipt.
(4) Nothing in this article prevents a party from exercising a right
to terminate the contract or to withhold performance or request inter-
est on money due.
Section 2: Right to Performance
Article 7.2.1
(Performance of monetary obligation)
Where a party who is obliged to pay money does not do so, the
other party may require payment.
Article 7.2.2
(Performance of non-monetary obligation)
Where a party who owes an obligation other than one to pay money
does not perform, the other party may require performance, unless
(a) performance is impossible in law or in fact;
(b) performance or, where relevant, enforcement is unreasonably
burdensome or expensive;
(c) the party entitled to performance may reasonably obtain per-
formance from another source;
(d) performance is of an exclusively personal character; or
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(e) the party entitled to performance does not require perform-
ance within a reasonable time after it has, or ought to have, become
aware of the non-performance.
Article 7.2.3
(Repair and replacement of defective performance)
The right to performance includes in appropriate cases the right to
require repair, replacement, or other cure of defective performance.
The provisions of Articles 7.2.1 and 7.2.2 apply accordingly.
Article 7.2.4
(Judicial penalty)
1) Where the court orders a party to perform, it may also direct
that this party pay a penalty if it does not comply with the order.
(2) The penalty shall be paid to the aggrieved party unless
mandatory provisions of the law of the forum provide otherwise. Pay-




(1) An aggrieved party who has required performance of a non-
monetary obligation and who has not received performance within a
period fixed or otherwise within a reasonable period of time may in-
voke any other remedy.
(2) Where the decision of a court for performance of a non-mone-




(Right to terminate the contract)
(1) A party may terminate the contract where the failure of the
other party to perform an obligation under the contract amounts to a
fundamental non-performance.
(2) In determining whether a failure to perform an obligation
amounts to a fundamental non-performance regard shall be had, in
particular, to whether
(a) the non-performance substantially deprives the aggrieved
party of what it was entitled to expect under the contract unless the
other party did not foresee and could not reasonably have foreseen
such result;
(b) strict compliance with the obligation which has not been per-
formed is of essence under the contract;
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(c) the non-performance is intentional or reckless;
(d) the non-performance gives the aggrieved party reason to be-
lieve that it cannot rely on the other party's future performance;
(e) the non-performing party will suffer disproportionate loss as a
result of the preparation or performance if the contract is terminated.
(3) In the case of delay the aggrieved party may also terminate the
contract if the other party fails to perform before the time allowed it
under Article 7.1.5 has expired.
Article 7.3.2
(Notice of termination)
(1) The right of a party to terminate the contract is exercised by
notice to the other party.
(2) If performance has been offered late or otherwise does not
conform to the contract the aggrieved party will lose its right to termi-
nate the contract unless it gives notice to the other party within a rea-
sonable time after it has or ought to have become aware of the offer
or of the non-conforming performance.
Article 7.3.3
(Anticipatory non-performance)
Where prior to the date for performance by one of the parties it is
clear that there will be a fundamental non-performance by that party,
the other party may terminate the contract.
Article 7.3.4
(Adequate assurance of due performance)
A party who reasonably believes that there will be a fundamental
non-performance by the other party may demand adequate assurance
of due performance and may meanwhile withhold its own perform-
ance. Where this assurance is not provided within a reasonable time
the party demanding it may terminate the contract.
Article 7.3.5
(Effects of termination in general)
(1) Termination of the contract releases both parties from their
obligation to effect and to receive future performance.
(2) Termination does not preclude a claim for damages for non-
performance.
(3) Termination does not affect any provision in the contract for
the settlement of disputes or any other term of the contract which is to





(1) On termination of the contract either party may claim restitu-
tion of whatever it has supplied, provided that such party concurrently
makes restitution of whatever it has received. If restitution in kind is
not possible or appropriate allowance should be made in money
whenever reasonable.
(2) However, if performance of the contract has extended over a
period of time and the contract is divisible, such restitution can only




Any non-performance gives the aggrieved party a right to damages
either exclusively or in conjunction with any other remedies except
where the non-performance is excused under these Principles.
Article 7.4.2
(Full compensation)
(1) The aggrieved party is entitled to full compensation for harm
sustained as a result of the non-performance. Such harm includes
both any loss which it suffered and any gain of which it was deprived,
taking into account any gain to the aggrieved party resulting from its
avoidance of cost or harm.
(2) Such harm may be non-pecuniary and includes, for instance,
physical suffering or emotional distress.
Article 7.4.3
(Certainty of harm)
(1) Compensation is due only for harm, including future harm,
that is established with a reasonable degree of certainty.
(2) Compensation may be due for the loss of a chance in propor-
tion to the probability of its occurrence.
(3) Where the amount of damages cannot be established with a




The non-performing party is liable only for harm which it foresaw
or could reasonably have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the




(Proof of harm in case of replacement transaction)
Where the aggrieved party has terminated the contract and has
made a replacement transaction within a reasonable time and in a rea-
sonable manner it may recover the difference between the contract
price and the price of the replacement transaction as well as damages
for any further harm.
Article 7.4.6
(Proof of harm by current price)
(1) Where the aggrieved party has terminated the contract and
has not made a replacement transaction but there is a current price for
the performance contracted for, it may recover the difference between
the contract price and the price current at the time the contract is
terminated as well as damages for any further harm.
(2) Current price is the price generally charged for goods deliv-
ered or services rendered in comparable circumstances at the place
where the contract should have been performed or, if there is no cur-
rent price at that place, the current price at such other place that ap-
pears reasonable to take as a reference.
Article 7.4.7
(Harm due in part to aggrieved party)
Where the harm is due in part to an act or omission of the aggrieved
party or to another event as to which that party bears the risk, the
amount of damages shall be reduced to the extent that these factors




(1) The non-performing party is not liable for harm suffered by
the aggrieved party to the extent that the harm could have been re-
duced by the latter party's taking reasonable steps.
(2) The aggrieved party is entitled to recover any expenses rea-
sonably incurred in attempting to reduce the harm.
Article 7.4.9
(Interest for failure to pay money)
(1) If a party does not pay a sum of money when it falls due the
aggrieved party is entitled to interest upon that sum from the time
when payment is due to the time of payment whether or not the non-
payment is excused.
(2) The rate of interest shall be the average bank short-term lend-
ing rate to prime borrowers prevailing for the currency of payment at
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the place for payment, or where no such rate exists at that place, then
the same rate in the State of the currency of payment. In the absence
of such a rate at either place the rate of interest shall be the appropri-
ate rate fixed by the law of the State of the currency of payment.
(3) The aggrieved party is entitled to additional damages if the
non-payment caused it a greater harm.
Article 7.4.10
(Interest on damages)
Unless otherwise agreed, interest on damages for non-performance
of non-monetary obligations accrues as from the time of non-
performance.
Article 7.4.11
(Manner of monetary redress)
(1) Damages are to be paid in a lump sum. However, they may be
payable in instalments where the nature of the harm makes this
appropriate.
(2) Damages to be paid in instalments may be indexed.
Article 7.4.12
(Currency in which to assess damages)
Damages are to be assessed either in the currency in which the
monetary obligation was expressed or in the currency in which the
harm was suffered, whichever is more appropriate.
Article 7.4.13
(Agreed payment for non-performance)
(1) Where the contract provides that a party who does not per-
form is to pay a specified sum to the aggrieved party for such non-
performance, the aggrieved party is entitled to that sum irrespective of
its actual harm.
(2) However, notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary the
specified sum may be reduced to a reasonable amount where it is
grossly excessive in relation to the harm resulting from the non-per-
formance and to the other circumstances.
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